Will Zarif Be Iran's Next Nuclear Negotiator?

Immediately after his inauguration as the 11th president of the Islamic Republic of Iran this past Sunday, Hassan Rouhani sent his proposed cabinet to Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani for  Parliament's vote of confidence, ending days of frenzied speculation around his appointments to the so called key ministries of intelligence, interior, culture and Islamic guidance, and the foreign ministry.

In his inaugural speech Rouhani stressed moderation, talking about tolerance and transparency at home, the need for urgent action to revive the economy, and said his government's approach to foreign policy was "constructive interaction" with the international community. The previous day, after being endorsed by the supreme leader, he had also enumerated the three most critical issues facing the country: economic recovery, revival of moral values and constructive interaction with the outside world.

Economic and foreign policy are inseparable for Iran these days and as Rouhani has said, the success of the "Government of Moderation" in both domains depends on constructive interaction with the international community. This interaction will be the key that can help open the door to success in Iran's nuclear case, the greatest challenge the country has faced since its eight-year war with Iraq.

When speculation around the prospective cabinet reached fever pitch before Sunday, the radical politicians who saw their presidential candidates roundly defeated in June reacted most strongly to one name above all: Mohammad Javad Zarif, Rouhani's choice for foreign minister. To these men, Zarif embodies the same foreign policy outlook they thought they had managed to permanently wipe away from Iran's future. The return of this seasoned diplomat can put an end, probably temporarily in their view, to the aggressive and exigent foreign policy of Ahmadinejad years. They had always considered the foreign policies of the governments of the reformist Mohammad Khatami and moderate Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as manifestations of step-by-step retreat.

This retreat had started with the acceptance of UN resolution 598, "imposed" on Ayatollah Khomeini, which ended the eight year "sacred defence" against Iraq. These radicals were never  able to forgive Ahmadinejad's predecessors for their pacifistic policies in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, and above all, on the nuclear issue. They considered these policies as giving away Iran's bargaining chips and surrendering to the evil world powers. In their view, all these were acts of a scenario which would ultimately end in the Islamic Republic's downfall. Bashar Assad's arrival in Tehran on Ahmadinejad's first day in office in 2005 signalled an immense change, when we look back.

Many observers believe that no decision, however small, is taken, and that no policy, foreign or domestic, is adopted, unless it is first endorsed by the leader of the Islamic Republic. If we accept that view, we need to admit that all the things done by the governments of Ahmadinejad's predecessors, including the designation of Iran's representative in the UN, were also directed by Ali Khamenei, or were at least tolerated by him. Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's permanent representative to the UN from 2002 to 2007 (the last two years falling under President Ahmadinejad and reportedly much against Zarif's own wish) in his recently published memoirs says of his designation as ambassador to the UN: "I think in February 2001 [foreign minister Kamal] Kharazi and I reached an agreement about my dispatch to New York. Apparently about the same time Dr Kharazi had informed the Supreme Leader." He adds that later, the Supreme Leader told him that on the same day he had told Ali Asghar Mir-Hejazi, his own chief of staff, that Zarif was "the best choice to be sent to New York." "But let the foreign ministry's normal procedure to complete. When he is officially presented to us, you [Mir-Hejazi] officially accept that [on our behalf]," Zarif quotes Khamenei as saying. "He also reminded me of some issues that were important to my mission, including something that I always recount to my students in my classes," Zarif goes on to say and adds: “He told me that if I was sure that my view was 180 degrees opposite to his, I had the responsibility to say that. He even said that was my religious duty. Thank God I have always done that.”

Those opposed to Zarif consider him the main member of the so-called “New York Gang.” He was only 22 when he joined the team of novice diplomats of the newly established republic in the United States. “The New York Gang” or “New Yorkers” refers to a group of US-educated Iranian diplomats who have served at the Iranian mission in the US or had a career in the foreign ministry's international relations department. Those who advocate an aggressive foreign policy believe the New Yorkers are dangerous and if not vigilant, will throw Iran into the trap set by the United States, leading to Iran's capitulated assimilation into the international community under the hegemony of America and its allies.

Zarif spent most of his working time at the Iranian mission in New York to prevent the nuclear issue from being referred to the UN Security Council and remain with the IAEA. He didn't succeed because unlike him the president in Tehran believed that resolutions were only “wastepaper” and that the UN Security Council would one day tire of issuing resolutions. A year and half later, Zarif returned to Iran to wait out Ahmadinejad's presidency.

Hassan Rouhani began handling Iran's nuclear case ten years ago at then Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi's recommendation and with President Khatami's approval. He was secretary of the Supreme National Security Council at the time and is now Iran's president and the first file that he will see on his desk is the same old and familiar one.

Since the nuclear case affects Iran's relations with the international community, it must be handled by the foreign ministry. But when the case was referred to the country's highest security-advisory body, the Supreme National Security Council, due to its complex nature and involvement of other security and military bodies. the Council is led by the president and its decisions are put to action after the approval of the Supreme Leader.

Rouhani's team at the Supreme National Security Council came from the foreign ministry where Zarif worked in close association with Hossein Mousavian and Sirus Naseri. Kazem Sajjadpour, another “New Yorker,” advised the team and Kamal Kharazi. Kharazi, one of the earliest members of the gang himself, supported them. Larijani, who succeeded Kharazi, didn't last long in the position because of his differences with Ahmadinejad. His main team members came from the intelligence ministry. Saeed Jalili, who had his career mainly in the foreign ministry, and succeeded Larijani, also went to the council with his diplomatic colleagues. Although through most of these years diplomats were in charge of the case, after Rouhani's tenure the negotiating team's outlook was security-driven rather than diplomatic.

Rouhani can now, with the Supreme Leader's approval, return the nuclear case to the foreign ministry and revive the diplomatic approach to resolving the standoff with the West. As president he is now also head of the Supreme National Security council and can revive the council's main function, which is to outline the country's security and diplomatic strategy, a mission obscured by the nuclear case during Saeed Jalili's tenure.

Mohammad Foruzandeh is said to be in line as the council's new secretary and Rouhani's replacement as one of Khamenei's two representatives on the council. He is among the trusted men of the Supreme Leader and has a military-security background. Forouzandeh has served as defense minister and is now the head of Mostazafan Foundation, a huge financial institution operating under the supervision of the Supreme Leader. The foundation owns tens of companies and factories as well as a bank, and is one of the financial arms of Khamenei's office. Mohammad Forouzandeh may have experience in some activities outside the country aimed at “overcoming oppression and assistance to the world oppressed” but he is not a diplomat. The kind of foreign policy that he is familiar with is not the type favoured by diplomats. It is of the security-military kind.

Unlike him, Zarif embodies all that the nuclear dossier requires: diplomacy. The current nuclear dead-end is of the diplomatic and political kind, not security. Saeed Jalili's failure resulted from his unfamiliarity with the intricacies of diplomacy and his lack of the subtlety that Zarif ("subtle, delicate" in Persian) has so amply. The most important step is the first step. Submitting the nuclear case to the foreign ministry will increase the ministry's manoeuvrability, bring it to the cabinet and augment Rouhani's supervision and management of the case.

In election debates Rouhani reminded Jalili that his own counterparts in nuclear talks were foreign ministers but as chief nuclear negotiator Jalili had to bargain with deputy foreign ministers who came to the negotiating table with limited powers. The new Iranian foreign minister and nuclear negotiator may soon be negotiating with foreign ministers of the six members of the P5+1 across the table. Like Rouhani's other proposed ministers  Zarif must wait for the parliament's vote of confidence. If he receives that, his first step in advance of another round of nuclear talks may be sending another "New Yorker" to New York.