Trump Calls for Defections in Iran - But Will the Military Break Away?

From Mohammad Reza Shajarian’s song “Lay Down Your Gun” to repeated appeals by Prince Reza Pahlavi and now Donald Trump, calls for Iran’s military to stand with the people have long been part of the struggle against the Islamic Republic - a demand that for years seemed almost impossible. But the situation appears to be shifting now, as the United States says it has killed more than 50 senior figures of the Islamic Republic, including Ali Khamenei.

On March 4, the President of the United States once again called on Iran’s military forces to lay down their arms or face “certain death.” For the first time, he also addressed Iranian diplomats worldwide, urging them to defect from the government, seek asylum, and help shape a better future for Iran. In recent weeks, Prince Reza Pahlavi has also repeatedly raised the issue of laying down arms and joining the people. Addressing the army, he has frequently warned them to join the people before it is too late. Nevertheless, evidence suggests that defections from the military and even the political body of the Iranian government have been minimal, even with the death of Ali Khamenei, whom protesters call “Zahhak.”

In this report, we look at the historical context of Iran’s 1979 Revolution, the fall of Bashar al-Assad and Saddam Hussein, and speak with Mohsen Sazegara (political activist and member of the Transition Council) and Mehrzad Boroujerdi (Professor of Political Science at Missouri University of Science and Technology) to better understand what conditions are needed for military defections to take place.

What Happened in Iran (1979), Iraq (2003), and Syria (2025) to Make the Military Surrender?

Looking at how several authoritarian regimes in the region collapsed offers perhaps the clearest insight into the circumstances under which Iran’s military might eventually lay down its weapons, flee, or side with the people.

The chain of events leading to the fall of the Shah’s government in February 1979 shows that three factors were influential: the presence of many leaders of various political groups inside Iran and the return of Ruhollah Khomeini; the Shah’s departure from Iran on January 16, 1979; and widespread strikes across various sectors, including the oil industry.

One of the most important factors behind the military’s collapse during the 1979 Revolution was that the Shah, before leaving the country, had warned the army not to shed the blood of the people. After his departure, the return of Khomeini and the growing wave of strikes and street protests led different branches of the military to break away from the Shah’s government and eventually side with the revolutionaries.

What is happening in Iran today, however, is more akin to military intervention and the destruction of military centers and command-and-control hubs of suppression. Therefore, examining the cases of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and Bashar al-Assad’s Syria may be more useful.

Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi dictator who came to power in 1979, saw his regime toppled in April 2003 by the U.S.-led coalition. Before the ground invasion, the U.S. had twice attempted to kill him via airstrikes. He eventually fled, was captured in an underground hole near Tikrit, tried over several years, and was executed by hanging at 6:07 AM on December 30, 2006, for “crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.”

In the case of the Assad regime, the process unfolded over a much longer period. Peaceful protests that began in 2011 were met with violent repression. In the years leading up to Bashar al-Assad’s fall in 2025, reports pointed to the role of Iranian and Russian support in helping him maintain power through repression and torture. Eventually, Russia’s deep involvement in the Ukraine war, Iran’s weakening under international sanctions, and the successive defeats of Iran’s proxy groups following the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel are widely seen as factors that contributed to Assad’s downfall.

On the ground, the opposition led by a young militia leader named Ahmed al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammed al-Julani) played a crucial role. Reports from the final days of battle show that he repeatedly asked his “mujahideen brothers” not to obstruct or kill Assad’s military forces if they chose to flee. While criticized by the families of the regime’s victims, this move was seen as a necessary tactic to secure victory over Assad.

There Must Be an Opposition Force on the Ground; To Whom Should They Hand Their Weapons?

Mehrzad Boroujerdi, a professor of political science at Missouri University of Science and Technology, told IranWire that military forces only lay down their arms when the leadership has “stepped aside.” He pointed to an advantage held by revolutions in other countries: the presence of an opposition force on the ground within the country’s borders.

“In places where there is an opposition on the ground that can attract these individuals, the issue becomes easier. Unfortunately, we do not currently have such a thing in Iran. Even if a typical soldier wants to join the people, it isn’t clear exactly who they are supposed to join or where they should hand over their weapon.”

Boroujerdi highlighted the discrimination against the regular Army (Artesh) compared to the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) as a potential catalyst for defections.

The government has long withheld support from the regular Army while directing resources and privileges toward the IRGC. Many IRGC members have also built their own businesses by taking advantage of sanction-evasion networks. Boroujerdi suggests that in a crisis, if Army personnel sense the balance of power shifting, they could take control of their own barracks.

However, he noted a significant hurdle: “Due to the rivalry between the IRGC and the security services, those who wish to join the people fear being exposed. Though, under current chaotic conditions, that fear may have diminished.”

According to Boroujerdi, defections within the Islamic Republic have not yet been “significant” at any level.

“As of the time we are speaking, defections have not been notable. Not a single cabinet minister has resigned or spoken out in opposition. Not one Grand Ayatollah has come forward to criticize the situation. As long as the political class hasn’t abandoned the field and remains behind the government, it is very unlikely military forces will act alone.”

The professor stressed that how the opposition treats military personnel will play a key role in determining whether they defect. If they believe they will be punished for everything that happened in the past, there will be little incentive for them to switch sides.

Boroujerdi argues for a general pardon process, where only those proven to have committed or ordered murders are tried separately.

“If the rank-and-file of the IRGC, Basij, and Army face messages of vengeance, they will continue to fight the people. They showed just last month that they are willing to kill tens of thousands to stay in power.”

This refers to the killing of protesters in January. After Prince Reza Pahlavi called for street protests on January 8 and 9, security forces opened fire on citizens demonstrating for better livelihoods and greater freedom, leaving thousands dead.

Boroujerdi noted a key difference between Iran and regional neighbors regarding “liberated zones.” In Iraq, Libya, and Syria, opposition forces had a physical presence and “liberated areas” within the country. Defectors knew exactly where to go and who to contact.

Currently, opposition forces outside Iran “do not cure the pain” because they lack a physical presence on the ground.

Finally, he warned that if the conflict shifts from air strikes to a ground invasion, it would trigger the patriotic sentiments of even those loyal to the regime. This would make the prospect of defections much more difficult and delay the collapse of the military apparatus.

Moderate Forces Inside Iran Can Win the Trust of the Military

Mohsen Sazegara, a political activist and former senior Iranian official who later became a dissident, told IranWire that the current developments in Iran are different from typical civil resistance or protest movements, meaning the dynamics behind military defections and the collapse of the regime’s security structure are also different from those seen in traditional uprisings.  

Emphasizing that vengeful rhetoric does not encourage military defections, he continues:

“Violence and confrontation give them the motivation to use violence themselves, if only for self-preservation. During the 1977–79 Revolution, they were given safe passage to leave, but later the generals were executed. Even at Behesht-e Zahra, Mr. Khomeini would say, ‘We want you to be masters, come to the side of the people.’ Therefore, this is the most crucial point. In the December protests [2017–18], the core slogan of Mr. Pahlavi’s supporters, ‘Long Live the Shah,’ lacked appeal for them and didn’t help pull them away from the Islamic Republic.”

However, Sazegara views the current situation as distinct from street protests:

“What is happening now is war - a war with the U.S. and Israel on one side, and the military apparatus of the Islamic Republic on the other. The apparatus of suppression has become the infantry of the military machine. This war has put them under intense pressure. Their centers are being hit constantly, and it is a war the Islamic Republic has already lost. We are now on the sixth day (the interview took place on Thursday, March 5), and they have suffered both an intelligence defeat - with the Commander-in-Chief and the Supreme Defense Council killed at the start - and a military defeat. Six days in, they haven’t managed a single effective operation against Israel or the U.S.; the skies are entirely controlled by the U.S. and Israel.”

Sazegara stresses that the lives of the IRGC, the Army, and the Basij are at risk:

“It is a battlefield where the army is defeated. There is nothing on the ground yet, but fire is raining from the sky. Therefore, the issue now is life and war. If the command dissolves - though they still maintain some cohesion - they become a defeated army. At this stage, it is vital that the victorious forces, namely the U.S. and Israel, grant amnesty to Iran’s military forces. Mr. Trump has mentioned this several times, offering safe passage so they can join the people.”

According to this republican political activist, the problem is a lack of direction for surrender:

“The issue now is: if they want to surrender, to whom do they surrender? To whom should they hand over their weapons? This is where Trump is right - a moderate leader inside Iran who doesn’t threaten them or make them fear for their lives could be effective. An internal, moderate leadership would greatly help them lay down their arms and defect.”

His remarks refer to statements made by Donald Trump about Iran’s future leadership. On Friday, March 6, as airstrikes intensified against government positions, judicial centers, and the remains of the Supreme Leader’s residence and underground tunnels, Trump said in a phone interview with CNN that Iran’s leadership has been “neutralized.” He added that he is looking for a new leader who would treat the U.S., Israel, and their partners well, even if that person is a religious figure and a future Iran is not a democratic country.

Sazegara suggests that one way toward peace and choosing moderate internal leadership is the release of political prisoners: if peace is made on U.S. terms, a primary condition must be the reconciliation of the Iranian people. Prisons must open; Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Zahra Rahnavard must be released from house arrest. Those currently imprisoned - many of whom seek a transition via free elections and referendums - could lead a peaceful transition.

“We have enough respected moderate leaders among the people who have spent years in detention. In Iran’s prisons, we have Nobel Peace Prize winners, brave journalists, and lawyers. They are the best group to form a ‘Supreme Council for National Reconciliation’ to grant amnesty to military, police, and intelligence forces and collect their weapons. This, I believe, fits Iran’s diverse society, where 48% are ethnic minorities. If these conditions are met, significant defections will occur - provided the talk of hangings and revenge is set aside so they have the courage to defect.”

When asked if he believes defections are likely given the risks, Sazegara concludes:

“The Islamic Republic can no longer suppress effectively. Don’t look at their state TV propaganda. The reality is that after six days of a war intended to last a month, they have no air force, no navy, and their missiles and drones are non-factors. The U.S. has hit them so hard that their attack capacity is in a downward spiral. They claim 700,000 armed Basijis are ready for asymmetric warfare if things get critical. But when those forces see they are safe, they will surely hand over their weapons.”