Rubio’s Warning to the Islamic Republic: Will IRGC Operatives Find Their Way to the U.S.?

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio addressed reporters at the White House on the morning of April 24 after a question was directed at President Donald Trump about whether the Iranian national football team might face issues traveling to the World Cup. Trump passed the question to Rubio.

Rubio said the United States has not created any barriers for the Iranian team’s participation in the tournament but made it clear that the concern is not about the players. Instead, he pointed to the individuals the Islamic Republic may try to bring into the U.S. as part of the delegation, under labels such as companions, journalists, coaches, or administrative staff. According to him, some of these individuals could have links to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Responding to the question, he said: “The Islamic Republic cannot bring a group of IRGC terrorists into the U.S. and pretend they are journalists or sports coaches.” His remarks drew a response from Mehdi Alinejad, Secretary-General of the Islamic Republic’s Olympic Committee. Speaking to reporters on Friday afternoon, April 24, he said: “The matter of the team’s presence or absence in the World Cup rests with the respected government and security institutions, which have not yet made a decision regarding this.”

Why Rubio’s Remarks Worry the Football Federation

Rubio’s comments about the Iranian team’s presence at the 2026 World Cup in the U.S., Mexico, and Canada suggest that American authorities and intelligence agencies have a detailed understanding of how Iran’s sports delegations are structured. At the same time, it sends a message to IRGC-linked and intelligence-connected figures within Iran’s sports system that the preferential treatment they once received during international travel may no longer apply.

At the core of these remarks is a long-standing concern for the Islamic Republic: who accompanies the national team abroad and whether trusted security-linked individuals can still be embedded within delegations under the cover of sports, media, or administrative roles. For years, the Iranian Football Federation has been led by figures with ties to the IRGC. From the Federation President, who has a background in IRGC Intelligence in Isfahan, to members of the Board of Directors, appointments are widely understood to go through approval from the IRGC Intelligence Organization. In that context, visa challenges for such delegations in the U.S. appear unsurprising.

The experience during visa applications for the World Cup draw ceremony pointed this clearly. It showed that U.S. authorities are not only aware of these individuals but also of their political leanings and any intelligence or military affiliations.

In late September 2025, Iranian media reported that the Federation submitted a list of nine delegates to the U.S. Embassy for visas to attend the World Cup draw. The list included Mehdi Taj, Amir Ghalenoei, Mehdi Mohammad-Nabi, Hedayat Membini, Mehdi Kharati, Siamak Ghelichkhani, Saeed Al-Hoei, Mehdi Malekabad, and Omid Jamali. In the end, only three visas were granted: to head coach Amir Ghalenoei, team manager Mehdi Mohammad-Nabi, and international relations official Omid Jamali. Figures such as Mehdi Taj, Mehdi Malekabad, Hedayat Membini, Saeed Al-Hoei, and Mehdi Kharati were denied entry. This marked one of the first clear signals of U.S. scrutiny over the composition of Iran’s football delegation.

Why Does the Football Federation Bring an Intelligence and IRGC Team to the U.S.?

Among those denied visas, Federation President Mehdi Taj stood out. His background in IRGC Intelligence, especially given that the U.S. designates the IRGC as a terrorist organization, is seen as a key reason behind the refusal. Mehdi Malekabad, who heads the Federation’s security office, was another notable case. A former Ministry of Intelligence employee, he had reportedly already been informed by the U.S. Embassy in October 2025 that his visa would not be approved due to his background.

The situation evolved further after the draw. According to information obtained by IranWire in February 2026, the Federation, in coordination with the IRGC Intelligence Organization, submitted a new list of ten individuals. It included many of the same names, Mehdi Taj, Amir Ghalenoei, Mehdi Mohammad-Nabi, Hedayat Membini, Mehdi Kharati, Saeed Al-Hoei, Mehdi Malekabad, and Omid Jamali, along with two additional names: Mohsen Motamedkia and Parham Khanlari.

The inclusion of Mohsen Motamedkia is particularly notable. IranWire reports that he, along with Ghasem Imani-Nejad, who heads security at the Ministry of Sports, had been tasked since January 10, following the suppression of protests, with submitting daily reports to the IRGC Intelligence Organization on the activities and statements of athletes, coaches, referees, and sports journalists. These reports are said to have contributed to arrests carried out by security agencies.

This suggests that the Federation’s delegation lists are not purely administrative. Instead, they may include individuals with direct links to the IRGC or the Ministry of Intelligence, or those closely connected to the state’s sports security structure. Rubio’s comments at the White House appear to address exactly this issue. His message signals that the U.S. intends to distinguish between athletes and security-linked personnel and will not allow individuals connected to the IRGC to enter the country under the cover of sports or media roles.

Will All Players Receive Visas?

At the same time, the visa issue may extend beyond officials and staff to include players themselves. In December 2025, Federation President Mehdi Taj said in an interview on the “Football Bartar” program on state television that the United States might deny visas to some players based on where they completed their military service. As a result, the Federation had already begun preparing backup options.

Iranian media later linked this concern to striker Mehdi Taremi, who, unlike many players, did not complete his military service through athletic exemptions but instead served in the IRGC Navy in Bushehr. This distinction, compared to players assigned to military teams as “soldier-footballers,” could become significant in visa evaluations. Past media activity may also factor into these decisions. This includes a 2017 tweet by Taremi expressing support for the destruction of Israel, which echoed remarks by Ali Khamenei and was widely circulated by IRGC-aligned outlets. Although the tweet was later deleted, screenshots remain available.

Other players, including Alireza Jahanbakhsh, Alireza Beiranvand, Shojae Khalilzadeh, Roozbeh Cheshmi, and Mehdi Torabi, have also, at various points, appeared in settings or activities aligned with the state’s messaging, whether through meetings with IRGC figures or interactions with government and security officials. Overall, concerns within the Football Federation about U.S. visa decisions appear to go beyond officials and support staff, extending to players as well.