“Lebanon’s border with Israel is Iran’s new defensive line”

While President Rouhani’s administration works hard to manage the political fallout of recent events—from the violent raid at Evin Prison on April 17th to the murder of a border guard by militant group Jaish al-Adl to ongoing criticism of nuclear negotiations—some of Iran’s hardliner politicians have mounted a renewed campaign to create a Shi’a powerbase across the Middle East.

In recent months military officials, including Massour Jazayeri and General Yahiy Rahim Safavi (pictured above), have used the crisis in Syria and relations with Lebanon and other countries to build support for a “Shi’a revival”, at the same time reaffirming Iran’s hostility towards its traditional enemies.

Earlier this year, Ghasem Soleimani, the commander of Ghods Force, which conducts special operations outside Iran, said that the Islamic Republic was working towards a revival of Shi’a power in the region. “Iran will be the axis of this revival and it will strengthen Iran in political, economic and security terms,” he said.

Some clerics and prominent hardliner figures envision a political and economic block totally controlled by Shi’as. Key to this, Soleimani said, is the “Shi’a Crescent”, referring to the geographical distribution of the Shi’a population across Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. For some, the revival extends to Shi’a populations in Bahrain and parts of Saudi Arabia too.

Envisioning a Shi’a territory that could expand along both geographical and political lines, General Safavi, Ayatollah Khamenei’s military advisor and former commander of the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), told an audience of Iran-Iraq war veterans and IRGC forces that “Lebanon’s border with Israel is Iran’s new defensive line”. He spoke of Iran's considerable power in the wider region, and said that "the West is worried that Iran’s influence is spreading from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean".

The Syrian Conflict: A Sign of Changing Times?

Many Iranian military leaders consider Syria to be a crucial battlefield in determining how the balance of power will be played out on the international stage, for Shi’as and for Iran. “America is not after democracy in Egypt or human rights in Syria or the nuclear question in Iran,” Commander Soleimani declared in September 2013. “They want to break the line of resistance, [but] we will support Syria to the end.”

Massoud Jazayeri, Deputy Chief of Staff of Iran's armed forces, stated in August 2013 that the civil war in Syria is a US-led plot. "America knows the limitation of the red line of the Syrian front,” he said, and warned that if this line was crossed, there would be “severe consequences for the White House.”

In April 2014, Revolutionary Guards Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari said the Iranian Islamic Revolution is not bound by Iran’s borders. Like Soleimani, he referred to Iran’s position at the “resistance front” of the Syrian conflict. He also spoke of the United States and Israel as being Iran’s biggest enemies, so any role they played in Syria will continue to be seen as a challenge to Iran.

Iran’s support for Syria has a religious dimension as well as the economic, political and military ones. In May last year, the hardliner MP Ruhollah Hosseinian said the Syrian crisis was a sign that the return of the “hidden” or twelfth imam—the central tenet of Shi’a faith—could soon be realized. According to Hosseinian’s understanding of Islamic tradition, when “masters of the yellow flag” confront non-Shi’a aggressors, as is happening between Lebanon’s Hezbollah (the flag of which is yellow) and non-Shi’as in Syria, the return of the twelfth imam is imminent. For some hardliner and fundamentalist Shi’a clerics, the turmoil in the Middle East and Syria is God’s plan to make Iran the center of the world’s gravity. Once this happens, the mahdi, or hidden imam, will return and rule the world from Iran.

Damage Control

Commander Soleimani views oil as the linchpin of the Shi’a crescent vision: “Oil is the most important element in the world economy,” he said. “We know that the three countries of Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iraq have largest reserves of oil in the world. Saudi Arabia is number one and Iran and Iraq are the second and the third. Around 70 per cent to 80 per cent of the world’s oil reserve lies in areas where Shi’as live.”

Unsurprisingly, a move towards Shi’a dominance has met with considerable criticism and concern from many across the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia is well aware of Iran’s ambitions in the region and has repeatedly accused Iran of inciting Saudi Shi’as to work against the kingdom’s central government. The governments of Bahrain, Yemen and Kuwait have also blamed Iran for trying to provoke Shi’a populations in their countries.

There can be little doubt that statements made by Safavi, Soleimani and others have the full support of Ayatollah Khamenei. In July 2013, Reza Taghavi, head of a religious council that functions under the Supreme Leader’s supervision, said that the Khamenei was behind Iran’s policies towards Syria, Lebanon and Gaza.

Outside the Middle East, theories about the symbolic and religious implications of the Syrian conflict and calls for Shi’ism to play a more dominant role in international relations will not be well received. Such claims could have a detrimental effect on how Iran positions itself in the wider world. If Rouhani’s rapport with the international  community depends largely on his reputation for pragmatism and calls for reform, he will have to work hard to make sure fundamentalist calls for a Shi’a-controlled territory are not the loudest and most prominent voices being heard.