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Politics

A New Stronghold for Hardliner Power?

June 17, 2014
Reza HaghighatNejad
4 min read
A New Stronghold for Hardliner Power?
A New Stronghold for Hardliner Power?

A New Stronghold for Hardliner Power?

 

In recent weeks, hardliners have been flexing their muscles in Iran, working hard to promote the values and politics of the Islamic regime as they see it. This week, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei appointed Saeed Jalili, former chief nuclear negotiator under President Ahmadinejad, to his Strategic Council on Foreign Policy, along with other hardliners. Jalili's new title does not give him executive power but it does provide him with political room to maneuver. It's the latest in a series of supportive measures for the former presidential candidate, who sits on a number of influential councils with close ties to the Supreme Leader. Former ambassador and bank head Ebrahim Sheibani, diplomat Mehdi Ahari Mostafavi and former Revolutionary Guards commander and Defense Minister General Ahmad Vahidi were also brought in to serve on the council.

Though the body was initiated by Khamenei himself in June 2006 , it rarely meets with the supreme leader, the last time being summer 2008. In its nine-year history, it has attracted little media attention on either a domestic or international level. For the most part, it has been inactive—and has been described as having very little influence: during his presidency, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad effectively ignored it. Yet the council still commands influence. Its mission, to take strategic decisions on foreign relations, work with foreign policy experts and submit its findings and conclusions to the Supreme Leader, makes it something like the American Council on Foreign Relations.

Before the recent shift, the body had in many ways represented and supported President Rouhani’s foreign policy. It included Kamal Kharrazi, Minister of Foreign Affairs under the reformist President Khatami; Ali Akbar Velayati, a former foreign minister who had been international affairs advisor to Khamenei; the head of the Center for Strategic Research and an important supporter of the current nuclear negotiating team; Secretary of the Supreme National Security Counci Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani; Mohammad Shariatmadari, Rouhani’s Vice President for Executive Affairs; and Mohammad Hossein Taremi, a conservative cleric, former Iranian ambassador to China and Saudi Arabia and the current head of the Center for Historical Studies.

The shake-up means that Velayati, Shamkhani and Shariatmadari have been given new responsibilities and are no longer in the council. Other new members include Ebrahim Sheibani, who was president of Iran’s Central Bank under Ahmadinejad until his resignation in 2007, after which he was appointed Iranian ambassador to Austria and Mehdi Ahari Mostafavi, Deputy Foreign Minister under Manouchehr Mottaki during the Ahmadinejad administration. In 2007, Mostafavi was appointed as the head of Islamic Culture and Relations Organization, responsible for the cultural diplomacy of the Islamic Republic. General Ahmad Vahidi has also been appointed to the council. Former commander of Revolutionary Guards and Defense Minister under Ahmadinejad, he is one of five Iranians that the Argentinian judiciary has accused of participating in the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, in which 85 people died. He is also on Interpol's list of suspects for the bombing. Vahidi also served as the head of the Political, Defense and Security Commission at the Expediency Council.

 

Despite an Election Loss, Power in the Council for Jalili

Jalili's new position in the council sends a clear message to Rouhani and his allies. By giving Jalili, who was the hardliners' favorite for the 2013 presidential election, continued presence in advisory and strategic positions, Khamenei has shown his commitment to keeping hardliners in the political arena. A few months ago Khamenei also appointed Jalili to the Expediency Council, which advises the Supreme Leader on all branches of government. Under Ahmadinejad, Hassan Rouhani was Khamenei’s representative at the Security Council, but after he was elected as president and became its head, Jalili was instated. And though Jalili was replaced as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Khamenei ensured he remained a member of that body too.

In November 2013, an article published on a website close to former Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki lashed out at the international relations group. The body, Mottaki said, should be more pro-active and public-facing, and a communications professional should be brought in to handle its public relations.

After the 2013 presidential election, Ahmad Alam al-Hoda, the hardliner Friday Prayers leader of Mashhad, said that Khamenei had told Jalili that “four million votes are an important social capital” and that Jalili must function as the cord that ties those millions together.

The realigned Strategic Council now has three prominent hardliners—Saeed Jalili, Ahmad Vahidi and Hossein Taremi, and two leading conservatives, Ebrahim Sheibani and Mehdi Mostafavi. The only reformist-leaning member is Kamal Kharrazi.

During Ahmadinejad’s presidency, most members of the Strategic Council were critical of the president’s foreign and nuclear policies—though Ahmadinejad paid little attention to their advice. Ahmadinejad’s spokesperson, Gholam-Hossein Elham, had dismissed the work of the council, asserting that foreign policy is the domain of the government.

In tactical terms this assessment is somewhat correct: foreign policy is run by the government. From a strategic viewpoint, however, the council's role as advisor to the Supreme Leader can actually influence decisions in foreign policy. It can act as a hub for opposing and criticizing the government—and it's a powerful network that always ultimately has the support of Supreme Leader Khamenei. Without a doubt, the revamped council has considerable political clout, with the power to potentially hamper any reforms Rouhani and his allies might be hoping to implement.

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