Who is Ebrahim Raeesi, the Man who Wants to Take Down Rouhani?

The Iranian presidential election is upon us, and candidates had only until the morning of May 18 to make their case to the voters. On the eve of the election, the two main contenders are Hassan Rouhani and Ebrahim Raeesi. 

There has been some talk that Raeesi is being primed to succeed Ayatollah Khamenei as the Supreme Leader. But as far as the office of the president is concerned, Raeesi has no experience in the executive branch. His only direct relevant experience is his role as guardian of the Astan Quds Razavi foundation, or “The Holy Belongings of Imam Reza,”  the richest religious endowment in Iran. The foundation, located in the holy city of Mashhad, oversees the shrine of the 8th Shia Imam and its associated assets, and enjoys the proceeds of the annual pilgrimage of around 25 million Shias Muslims. The Supreme Leader directly appoints the guardian of the foundation.

In 1988, Raeesi was part of Ayatollah Khomeini’s “death panel.” A prosecutor at the time, Raeesi and three other men were tasked with carrying out the Supreme Leader’s orders to execute thousands of political prisoners. 

Raeesi is the son-in-law of Ahmad Alamolhoda, the hardliner Friday Prayers leader of Mashhad who wields substantial control and influence over Iran’s second biggest city. Alamolhoda has been in the news often over the last two years due to his hardline stance on live music, and his call for concerts to be banned in Mashhad — even when performers had secured the necessary permits from the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. 

Raeesi has repeatedly pointed to his record in Mashhad throughout his campaign, in campaign ads and during presidential debates — even though he has only been doing the job for a year. 

So what is his record as a leader?  How big is his popularity base in Mashhad, Iran’s second city? How impressive have his achievements been, and why do his supporters believe it puts him in such good stead to lead the country?

Mohammad Sadegh Javadi-Hesar is a journalist and a member of the central council of the reformist National Trust Party. He lives in Mashhad and has closely watched Raeesi during his time as the guardian of Astan Quds Razavi. In order to get a better idea of the ultra-conservative presidential candidate and what his presidency could mean, we talked to Javadi-Hesar about Raeesi’s character, his short career as head of the Astan Quds Razavi foundation, and his influential father-in-law. 

Ebrahim Raeesi’s opponents have declared to voters: Do not vote for him if you don’t want Iran to be remade in the image of Ahmad Alamolhoda. But, from what you have seen of his character and his performance in Mashhad, how similar is he to Alamolhoda?

The political and cultural structure of Iran is not going to change under the influence of an individual’s character. Individuals can change things in certain areas but it is unlikely that they can change the culture or remake the country in the image of an Alamolhoda or an Ahmadinejad. Such a belief does not match with reality.

Raeesi is not different from others, and has a conventional character. It is his position that has given weight to certain considerations. A judge issues verdicts but these verdicts do not reflect everything about him. People’s character can be different from their positions. For example, a satirical poet or artist can be a very serious person in his personal life. And society is not shaped by the character of individuals.

Some time ago news emerged that Raeesi had opposed the ban on concerts, but the report was later denied. Has Raeesi said anything or done anything that suggests he disagrees with Alamolhoda with regard to social freedoms or other policies?

No, I have witnessed no such opposition. But in his campaign material, I have not noticed anything that endorses political or cultural repression. I do not believe that because of his family connections with Alamolhoda we should tie their political positions together too tightly. Many fathers and their children and many siblings hold views that are different from each other. Alamolhoda and Raeesi are two different people.

What about Raeesi’s record in Mashhad? Has he done anything that has had positive or negative effects?

When the Supreme Leader ordered the appointment of Ebrahim Raeesi, Raeesi was given two tasks: Attending to, and expansion of, services for pilgrims to Imam Reza’s shrine; and taking care of the poor and the needy in Mashhad, the so-called “neighbors” of the shrine. Since then, we have seen via the media that he has visited various areas of the city, especially the underprivileged neighborhoods. He has visited people’s homes as their guest, has listened to what the poor and the needy have to say and has given them some help. In my view, he made noticeable efforts in the mission entrusted to him by the Supreme Leader. We cannot say that Raeesi has done nothing.

You mean he did these things before the election campaign began and before making his campaign videos?

Yes, before the election campaign. Of course the nature of his position is such that he was recorded wherever he went, and he was able to use these recordings later for his campaign.

Could the actions you just mentioned have been a cover for Raeesi to represent the security establishment in Iran’s power structure, or at least in the city of Mashhad?

Before his current position in Mashhad, his security profile was not very prominent, especially before he became a presidential candidate. People did not know him. Only those who were involved in security matters or who were in communication with the judiciary were familiar with him. Plus, for years and years, Raeesi was not in Mashhad. Since the revolution he spent most of his life in Tehran and within the judiciary. In Mashhad he was known as one of several Islamic Republic judicial authorities.

This same obscurity might have been a plus in the eyes of the principlist conservatives. How do you see his support base now that he has worked and lived in Mashhad for some time?

Had he not been the principlists’ candidate there would not have been so much talk about him. The same would have happened if they had chosen another candidate, meaning that traditional and moderate principlists would have gathered around that candidate in the same way that today they have gathered around Raeesi. The people around Raeesi and how well he is known are not the same matter. The same thing would have happened if the principlists had picked Saeed Jalili or Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.

Of course, if he prayed at a specific mosque like certain clergymen we could have arrived at a different conclusion. We could have said that he follows a certain ayatollah and go from there. But Raeesi does not fit this pattern.

Do you think Raeesi was able to attract more voters in the final run-up to the election?

This is a good question. Maybe some people who do not believe Raeesi is very capable will vote for him because they are against Rouhani or because they cannot find a better candidate. They might believe that the next president must be a favorite of the principlists, so they would vote for Raeesi in spite of the shortcomings they find in him. After all, many would vote for Rouhani for similar reasons. For these people, Rouhani is not their ideal candidate, but he is the best choice from among the presidential candidates.

What is your prediction for the outcome of the election? Will the Rouhani-Raeesi polarization intensify?

According to the polls and surveys available, Mr. Rouhani will win in the first round. Of course, it is possible that he will not win a very high percentage of votes and get at most 55 percent. But if the polarization has intensified, then voters might become more motivated and it would be possible for Rouhani to get more votes.

Why do you think the principlist conservatives picked Raeesi? We do know that he was a student of Khamenei and his name is among the list of prominent candidates to succeed the Supreme Leader.

I don’t think there was a script. Some people say that principlists set him up to discredit him or that they wanted to measure his popularity. But none of these speculations are based on reliable evidence. I myself do not have reliable news from centers of power or from people close to the Leader. But it seems to me that those who want to see him as the Supreme Leader wanted to facilitate it for him. They wanted to prepare the groundwork for him and provide him with a better image, so they asked him to become a presidential candidate.