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Features

Whose Cabinet is it?

July 31, 2017
Reza HaghighatNejad
5 min read
Whose Cabinet is it?
Whose Cabinet is it?

Just days ahead of inauguration day, Iranian reformists have expressed outrage over the battle to control President Rouhani’s new cabinet. 

Rouhani’s second term officially begins on Saturday, August 5 — and as the day nears, speculation and panic over the new cabinet have increased across the political spectrum, but especially with reformists.  

All signs suggest that reformists will lose out. “Reports about the the next cabinet are worrying,” prominent reformist politician Abdollah Nouri told a group of university students, adding his voice to the growing swell of anger over Rouhani’s cabinet appointments, including widespread criticism on social networking sites. 

But, considering the political reality in Iran, how justified is the reformists’ anxiety?

The most influential “lobby” in deciding the makeup of Rouhani’s new cabinet is, of course, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. On July 28, Khamenei’s official website published a short commentary [Persian link] emphasizing that the “usual procedure” in all Iranian administrations has been to “coordinate” with the Supreme Leader “in choosing ministers for defense, foreign affairs and intelligence.” And the Supreme Leader takes a particular interest in “certain portfolios,” the article reminds readers, including the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance and the Ministry of Justice. According to Iranian law, the justice minister must be chosen from a list recommended by the head of the judiciary, so this will obviously be someone who has the approval of the Supreme Leader. He has also shown an interest in the the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology — which also supervises state-run universities, although this role has not historically been one of his priority focuses.

 

The Battle to Control the Economy

The Ministry of Science has become a new interest for the Supreme Leader, but over the last 10 years, so has the economy — and this is perhaps as troubling as his interest in the Ministry of Justice. In fact, over the last decade, Khamenei has increasingly interfered in the economy, putting considerable pressure on the government through his own statements, but also through various institutions under his control. Examples include introducing delays in approving the new Iran Petroleum Contract (IPC) model that gives the government more flexibility in oil and gas deals with foreign companies like the French oil giant Total, as well as holding back Iran’s adoption of guidelines set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which is necessary for Iran to reintegrate into the international banking system and to effectively fight money laundering. Of course, the Leader does not do this by making official statements or by taking direct action, but through indirect means via organizations he controls. The real force behind these pressures are groups that feel threatened by the opening up of the Iranian economy to a post-sanctions world: The Revolutionary Guards’ contracting arm, Khatam-al Anbiya Construction Headquarters, and the so-called Executive Headquarters of Imam's Directive, a conglomerate worth over $90 billion. Khamenei himself directly applies the pressure, alongside the media affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards. And the pressures have not been completely futile. For example, President Rouhani’s current Oil Minister Bijan Zangeneh, a bête noire of Rouhani’s opponents, has expressed unwillingness to be a member of the next cabinet, although his decision is not final.

Supporters of Parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani have also applied pressure and had an influence over the make-up of the next cabinet. Within the Islamic Republic’s 290-member parliament, coalitions supporting or opposing Rouhani have at most between 100 to 110 votes. Neither side has enough votes to decide issues in full, and they both need Larijani’s supporters to form a majority. Larijani tries to have a say in a number of important portfolios, such as the Interior Ministry but, in general, he does not insist that appointees be principlists or people he approves. He would be happy with anybody whom he, as a principalist, can defend and lobby for. This, of course, limits the chances reformists have to take on portfolios, particularly in areas of government that specifically interest Larijani.

Guardians of “Moderation”

The third pressure group is Rouhani’s supporters. This powerful clique is entrenched at Rouhani’s office and at the office of the Budget and Planning Organization. Its members jealously push their ideas on the economy and, naturally, they do not want somebody like the reformist First Vice President Eshagh Jahangiri to be at the helm of the government’s economic policies. Their aim is to act as guardians of the cabinet and prevent it from falling into the lap of the reformists. The same is true when it comes to Rouhani’s deputies and advisors, and even his communications team. Mohammad Nahavandian, Rouhani’s Chief of Staff, held responsibility for this during the president’s first term. If he stays at his job, or if he is succeeded by somebody like the current Minister of Communications Mahmoud Vaezi, this role will continue to be important, or even become more important. For the most part, this group are members of the Moderation and Development Party and are close to Speaker Larijani.

None of the three pressure groups have reformist leanings. They could easily decide the fate of at least 11 portfolios across the 18 ministries that Rouhani will present for approval to parliament. But reformists do have a chance in the remaining seven ministries — Communications, Sports, Health, Roads and Urban Development, Labor, Agriculture and Industry and Energy — provided nobody important in Rouhani’s circle wants the job too badly.

To ensure they do have some power, reformists will have to focus on mid-level positions like vice presidents and advisors to Rouhani. At the moment, any hopes for important cabinet-level positions are unrealistic.

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