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Rouhani Rewards Guards with Anti-Smuggling Operation in Persian Gulf

March 7, 2018
Reza HaghighatNejad
13 min read
Revolutionary Guards’ spokesman General Ramezan Sharif confirmed that the Guards are now responsible for fighting smuggling in the Persian Gulf
Revolutionary Guards’ spokesman General Ramezan Sharif confirmed that the Guards are now responsible for fighting smuggling in the Persian Gulf

President Hassan Rouhani has announced that the Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the elite military force tasked with protecting the Islamic Republic from both external and internal threats, will be responsible for leading the fight against smuggling in the Persian Gulf. 

General Ramezan Sharif, a spokesman for the Guards, confirmed that the country’s Supreme National Security Council had come to a “specific decision” regarding the fight against illegal trade in the gulf — from drugs to tea to luxury items. 

Rouhani has called for the Guards to take a firm role in combating smuggling for more than four years, starting with comments he made on September 16, 2013, shortly after he was elected president. Now the Supreme National Security Council has finally made it official. 

The exact details and mechanisms of the anti-smuggling operations will be decided by the General Staff of the Armed Forces and the Revolutionary Guards’ Navy. But the Guards have a long association with smuggling, in at least six separate areas  — though these links are at odds with the image of a force fit to tackle smuggling, and are hardly reassuring.

 

1. “Invisible” and Unauthorized Piers

The Guards control a number of ports that have come under scrutiny in recent years. Between May 19 and May 23, 2004, Iranian parliament’s Committee on the Economy prepared a report on tea smuggling that uncovered a number of  “unauthorized piers not under supervision of agencies responsible for fighting smuggling.” Military ports operated by the Guards included Chabahar on the Gulf of Oman, Shahid Bahonar Port, which is part of Bandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf, the military port on the strategic island of Abu Musa, Bushehr and Mah Shahr military port. “There are rumors about how these ports are being used,” the committee’s report said, adding that it had “tried to clarify the situation and to obtain documented information,” but that so far, it had been unable to do so. 

So although there was a lack of evidence one way or another, some felt it was important for parliament to be made aware of the rumors being circulated. “These invisible piers are controlled by unofficial agencies that are beyond the reach of law,” said Hossein Loghmanian, the representative from Hamedan. “Hidden Mafiosi hands bring in 68 percent of imports through smuggling...Officials and media have repeatedly reported that drugs are moved and distributed through this channel.”

And he was not the only one to point out the role military piers had in the smuggling business. “40 percent of piers, with or without permits, have a record of smuggling,” said Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who was at the time the head of the Central Headquarters to Fight Goods and Drug Smuggling, before becoming Tehran’s mayor in early 2005.

Part of the report was read out in parliament. Representatives heard that there were 48 piers without permits, including three that belonged to the Revolutionary Guards. But other sections of the report were not aired — and furthermore, details about the role of the military were not entered into the records of the parliament. It was only later that Mehdi Karroubi, who was then the speaker of the parliament, stated that the number of piers operating without a permit was 60. Mohammad Ali Moshfegh, advisor to Karroubi at the time, said that 60 percent of imports to Iran were handled through unauthorized ports.

Over the next few years, the number of illegally operating piers appeared to decrease, though again, there was no ample evidence for this— figures were made available only through what various politicians claimed. In 2005, Ghalibaf said that there were 27 unauthorized piers, and in 2007, Gholamhossein Elham, a spokesman for President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s administration, put the number at 24. Later statements by Ahmad Khorram, the Minister of Roads and Transportation under President Mohammad Khatami, who parliament impeached in October 2004, reveal that these numbers were either lies or, at the very least, erroneous. And since then, there has not been any agreement on the number of unauthorized piers. In the summer of 2011, the Iranian Students’ News Agency (ISNA) put the number at 80 but, at the same time, the weekly Aseman, quoting unnamed officials, reported that the number was 151. Then the deputy head of the Central Headquarters to Fight Goods and Drug Smuggling said that number of piers operating without a permit was 167. In an interview on March 9, 2017, Khorram said that at the time the number of unauthorized piers was actually 94. “One of the things that led to my impeachment was that I was fighting illegal transit points [piers],” he told the website Omid Iranian. “These transit points were under the control of the military and the police. I was the first person to bring the subject up, which of course cost me dearly...We believed that everything must go through customs...the military is exempt from paying tolls, taxes and customs duties, but they should not be exempt from inspection by the customs [unit].”

Whatever the precise number, one thing is clear. Between 2004 and 2015, the number of reported unauthorized ports actually increased, regardless of the numbers cited. The Aseman and ISNA reports were published at the same time that President Ahmadinejad famously lashed out at the Revolutionary Guards and referred to them as “brother smugglers.” As usual, however, the Guards were unfazed and responded to Ahmadinejad’s taunt with a short and simple answer. “Like other military institutions, the Guards have piers at their disposal but they don’t use it for commercial activities,” said the Revolutionary Guards’ commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari in summer 2011.

Ahmadinejad’s successor, Hassan Rouhani, also had intentions of addressing the problem of Iran’s unauthorized piers. In early 2015, he began to take action. Three years on, he has changed his mind, and given the task of fighting smugglers in the Persian Gulf to the Revolutionary Guards, who control the unauthorized piers. In so doing, he neatly stows the problem out of his sight, letting the Guards ignore the issue too. 

 

2. Border Marts or Mini Bizarres

In addition to unauthorized piers, the 2004 parliamentary committee report looked at the increase of smuggling through “border marts,” or small bazaars on borders to which people on either side have access. The report cites the Guards’ determination to control these areas of trade. According to it, since 2005, the Guards Corps has established “security doorways” in these marts, meaning that it can import goods without being subject to the supervision of customs officials.

These “security doorways” go against what the Supreme National Security Council ruled — that these border transit points must be controlled by the Customs Organization and the police.  

In particular, the report cited the specific example of the Piranshahr customs station on Iran’s border with Iraq. The Guards Corps, it said, had set up its own “security doorway” in Piranshahr, independent of the customs area. Despite the report’s clear statement that “the legal and logical responsibility of fighting smugglers lies with the Interior Ministry, the police and the Customs Organization” and not with the Revolutionary Guards, the Guards Corps has continued the practice, building more “security doorways” in these marts and in other land border areas.

 

3. Airports

In 2004, Abbas Taghizadeh, known as “Little Abbas,” was arrested for smuggling through Payam International Airport in Karaj, near Tehran, which is run by the Revolutionary Guards. It was reported that $12 billion worth of merchandise was smuggled through Payam International and that both the private and state sectors had partnered with Taghizadeh and the Guards to generate their illegal gains.

Another case of alleged smuggling occurred at Tehran’s Mehrabad Airport, which, again, was run by the Guards. According to a 2007 report by the newspaper Iran, between autumn 2004 and winter 2006, the airport was turned into a hub of smuggling for “billions of dollars’ worth of luxury items, mobile phones and cosmetics.” But, unlike the case of Payam International Airport, the Mehrabad case was not talked about much. As a result, it is not widely known that 25 terminals at the airport are actually controlled by the Guards and not the Customs Organization, and have been since 2004.

 

4. Drug Trafficking and Money Laundering

In addition to Mohammad Loghmanian’s reference in parliament to drug trafficking through “invisible piers,” there was another link between the Guards and drug smuggling. On March 7, 2012, the US Department of Treasury designated Revolutionary Guards Brigadier General Gholamreza Baghbani, a commander of the expeditionary Qods Force (IRGC-QF), to be a trafficker of heroin exports to the West, in line with the treasury’s Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Act. 

“Today’s action exposes IRGC-QF involvement in trafficking narcotics, made doubly reprehensible here because it is done as part of a broader scheme to support terrorism. The Treasury will continue exposing narcotics traffickers and terrorist supporters wherever they operate,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen.

General Baghbani “is an IRGC-QF officer and the current chief of the IRGC-QF office in Zahedan in southeastern Iran, near the Afghan border,” reads the US Treasury’s statement. “General Baghbani allowed Afghan narcotics traffickers to smuggle opiates through Iran in return for assistance. For example, Afghan narcotics traffickers moved weapons to the Taliban on behalf of Baghbani. In return, General Baghbani has helped facilitate the smuggling of heroin precursor chemicals through the Iranian border. He also helped facilitate shipments of opium into Iran.”

WikiLeaks also alleged the Guards’ involvement in drug trafficking and money laundering in June 2012. According to a report by BBC Persian [Persian link], the US Embassy in Azerbaijan sent a confidential letter to the State Department in January 2009, accusing Revolutionary Guards officials of “drug trafficking to the Republic of Azerbaijan.” And in a March 9, 2009 telegram published by WikiLeaks, the American chargé d’affaires in Baku warned the State Department about Iranian money laundering through Azerbaijani banks to bypass international sanctions. The telegram also listed the names of Iranian citizens who laundered money for the Iranian government under the guise of private commercial activities.

Another leaked US Embassy document, dated June 12, 2009, accuses Guards officials of drug trafficking through Azerbaijan and claimed that the heroin smuggled from Iran to the Republic of Azerbaijan had reached 59 thousand kilograms in 2009 from just 20 kilos in 2006. The document claimed that Iran purchases more Afghan opium than any other country, and is the biggest producer of heroin in the world. It further claimed that Iranian security agencies use the Republic of Azarbaijan as the main route for smuggling drugs into Europe.

In 2013, an Iranian-American, Manssor Arbabsiar, was convicted of plotting to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United States. According to prosecutors, he confessed that Iranian military officials, including members of the Qods Force, were involved in the plot. While he was in Mexico, the prosecutor said, Arbabsiar had met a US government agent posing as a member of a violent Mexican drug cartel, later sending $100,000 to the undercover agent as an initial payment for the murder. And in 2013 the Israeli Defense Minister claimed that Iranian agents have become major players in drug trafficking in Latin America.

 

5. Arms Smuggling

When it comes to arms smuggling, there are many cases against the Revolutionary Guards from various parts of the world.  

In November 2008, US forces in Iraq arrested Nader Ghorbani, a member of the Qods Force, on charges of smuggling arms to insurgents [Persian link]. He was released shortly following intervention from the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, but about two months later, five other officers from the Qods Force were arrested in Iraq.

In July 2009, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, a senior commander of the Shia militia in Iraq, was put on the US Treasury’s blacklist because, among other charges, he worked with the Qods Force  to run “a weapons smuggling network that moved sniper rifles through the Iran-Iraq border to Shia militias that targeted Coalition Forces.” And in March 2010, Mansour bin Rajab, a Bahraini state minister, was dismissed on charges of laundering money for drug traffickers and arms smugglers, including members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.

In addition to Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have also identified Revolutionary Guards-connected arms and drug smuggling networks. In September 2015, the foreign ministers of Gulf Cooperation Council — consisting of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates — condemned Iran’s interference in their domestic affairs and its attempts to stir division and sectarianism. The statement said that Iran’s interference included harboring fugitives, setting up camps to train terrorists or smuggling weapons and explosives to carry out terror acts.

Of course, the Revolutionary Guards’ most significant arms smuggling operation has been to supply arms to the Lebanese Hezbollah through Syria. This has become easier now that the Quds Force and its allies control major areas of Syria. In 2011, Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security organization, reported that the Revolutionary Guards were using Egypt to smuggle arms to various terrorist groups such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. And in June 2017, Israel’s chief of military intelligence, Major General Herzl Halevi, said that Iran had been working over the previous year to set up independent production facilities in Lebanon to manufacture precise weapons that use advanced technology to guide them to specific targets.

The Guards also operate a very active arms smuggling network in Yemen. This network succeeded in smuggling missile parts into Yemen and on January 12, 2018, a United Nations panel concluded that the Islamic Republic had violated a UN arms embargo by directly or indirectly providing missiles and drones to the Shia rebels in Yemen.

In 2010, the government of Nigeria accused Azim Aghajani, a member of the Qods Force, of smuggling a shipment of rockets and explosive into the country. In 2015, he was sentenced to five years in prison. The shipment was meant for Gambia and in 2010, Gambia broke all ties to Iran.

Revolutionary Guards’ arms smuggling operations targeted other African countries, including Senegal, Kenya and Sudan. According to a 2012 UN Security Council Sanctions Committees report, Behineh Shipping Company smuggled Iranian arms into West Africa, and the company had been involved in smuggling operations for at least two years.

 

6. Associated Networks

In recent years, whenever reports the involvement of Lebanese Hezbollah in drug trafficking or the smuggling of goods in and out of various continents, the Revolutionary Guards Corps is usually mentioned as well. One of the best-known examples is US media reports on the anti-drug smuggling operation “Cassandra,” rolled out under President Obama. Radio Farda reported [Persian link] about a network in Africa that “not only was engaged in illegal drugs but also in arms, cars, diamonds, commercial merchandise and even humans in the form of slavery. The Lebanese Hezbollah and the Guards’ Qods Force are not only active in Africa but are also extending their activities to other new markets.”

**

 Over the last two decades, a variety of drug smuggling charges have been levelled against former commanders of the Revolutionary Guards. The most prominent figure among them is Mohsen Rezaei who was accused of smuggling cigarettes. Mahmoud Seif, a former CEO of Mobin Diamond Trade and who has been recently placed on the US sanctions list, was active in an arms smuggling ring in Eastern Europe that was connected to the Qods force. He was recently involved in a counterfeiting ring in Yemen.

It is not possible to compile a comprehensive list of all the smuggling activities the Revolutionary Guards have been involved in, or even a list of the accusations against the Guards — especially since over the last decade, it has become very adept in covering its tracks. But what is clear is that, by giving the Guards the official power to fight smuggling in the Persian Gulf, the government of President Rouhani is presenting it with an opportunity it cannot resist. It is a public quid pro quo between Rouhani’s government and the Revolutionary Guards. In other words, Iran’s civilian government is making a deal with the “armed government” of Iran.

 

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Interrogation, Revolutionary Guards Style

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