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Features

The Misguided Debate about Federalism in Iran

June 3, 2019
Mohammad Mohebi
11 min read
In Iran, you cannot clearly draw lines among ethnic groups so they can be separated by borders. Any attempt to draw borders between ethnic groups is bound to lead to war and bloodshed
In Iran, you cannot clearly draw lines among ethnic groups so they can be separated by borders. Any attempt to draw borders between ethnic groups is bound to lead to war and bloodshed

In the first article of IranWire’s series about federalism and the Islamic Republic, Mohammad Mohebi looks at the current debate over the federalist promise for the country, and asks whether it can ever be realized.

 

Former president Mohammad Khatami recently sparked fresh debate on the future of Iran, announcing that he supported a federalist form of government. The controversial comments led to a flurry of responses from activists, pundits and political analysts, both within Iran and among the diaspora.

In IranWire’s new series on federalism, we ask activists, analysts, lawyers and academics to give their view on federalism and whether it could be a future for Iranian politics and society. Could it be the pathway for ushering in greater freedoms, or will it sow greater divisions in an already fragmented country? What would it mean for Iran’s ethnic and religious minorities, and does it go against the principles of equality so many Iranians want to see in their country? 

IranWire invites academics and specialists from different countries, particularly those that have dealt with federalism from countries including Spain, Canada, Belgium, and the US, to contribute to the series. Your articles will be published in both English and Persian. 

 

Every once in a while the political denizens of Iran revive the long-running argument over federalism, and each time, the discourse becomes more muddled and confounded. Unfortunately, the most recent debates over federalism have been of very low quality, since most of the commentators are quite unclear about their actual stance on the subject — whether they advocate federalism or oppose it.

People who support federalism say it will help decentralize power and eradicate discrimination and those against it say it poses the threat of breaking up the country. But federalism has nothing to do with partition, decentralization or helping to end discrimination. On the contrary, federalism is a tool and part of a process for aggregating and centralizing power with the aim of building a new Iran. Given this, it is clear that federalism has no place in the current climate, and that any call for federalism to be introduced cannot be justified. So current debates about the pros and cons of federalism are essentially meaningless. Anybody who advocates federalism for present-day Iran and believes himself to be a federalist either does not know the meaning of federalism or is hiding behind the mask of federalism to push his or her particular agenda.

 

Why Federalism is Irrelevant in Iran

Federalism, as its Latin root foedus makes clear, means “covenant,” “league,” “treaty,” or “alliance.” Legally speaking, it means that a number of neighboring states or quasi-states with distinct borders could unite and set out to establish a new sovereign country. It does not mean partitioning a unified country, setting up governments within these partitioned areas and reunifying these governments within the framework of a federal system. In other words, federalism is a way and a process to establish a new country, not a mechanism for reorganizing a country.

Currently, federalism is transitioning from being a drive for multiplicity to one of unity, not the other way around. No historic model suggests or proves otherwise. Take the example of Belgium. From the very first day Belgium was established it was a “united states.” After World War II it was a “union” for a short time, and then, gradually, made a transition to the existing federal system.

Even the bloody, and mostly failed, experiment with federalism in Iraq is not an exception to the rule. Over half a century of armed struggle, which cost more than a million lives, the Iraqi Kurds won a de facto “autonomy” and, after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Kurdish autonomous officials joined the government in Baghdad within the framework of a federal system, and since then, the Iraqi president has been elected from among the Kurds, establishing a new political tradition.

Theory aside, in practice there has been no example of federalism where there has been a transition from unity to multiplicity. In fact, the process of moving from a unified system to a system based on multiplicity is not actually federalism in action, it’s secessionism. And this proposition and conclusion is not purely based on legal theory but on the practical experience of federalism across the world. Every model of federalism in a particular country is different from another, depending on the social and political context. For instance, federalism in Germany has worked for decades and is shaped differently from, say, that of the United States. But the basic nature of federalism is the same in all countries that regard themselves as being federalists. A move from multiplicity to unity is the only common feature bonding federal countries around the world.


Why Partition of Iran is irrelevant to Federalism

It is important to separate the idea of partition in Iran from discussions about promoting federalism in the country — the two ideas are essentially disparate.

For example, it is a mistake to say that “federalism is a prelude to secession and partition” and also to say “federalism is worse than partition.”

The first mistake is to assume that federalism in Iran has been officially recognized and the only thing standing in the way of it being established in Iran is anxiety over partition. It is important not to cast supporters of federalism as victims, suggesting that their right to campaign for federalism has been violated by labeling them “secessionists”. Of course, anyone advocating for secessionism must also be transparent, and not hide behind the banner of federalist campaigning.

There is also a danger in giving too much weight to the idea of partitioning Iran. Some Islamic Republic officials have fueled fear about this potential split, but the fear it has generated has not been in line with realistic expectations. Of course, it is honorable for any Iranian citizen to want to uphold the unity and integrity of Iran. This concern goes beyond the virtue of patriotism or the ideology of nationalism — an ideology that is irrelevant to Iran and which is different from patriotism. It is a pragmatic, humanistic and peaceful concern. And the reason is very clear: In Iran, you cannot clearly draw lines among ethnic groups so the country can be separated by borders. Any attempt to draw borders between ethnic groups is bound to lead to war and bloodshed.

In fact, without question, there can be no borders among ethnic groups in Iran. If such a border is to be drawn, or if cessation is on the agenda, where would the border between the Kurds and the Azeris fall? Or between Kurds and Lors? Between Arabs and Lors and Bakhtiaris? Between Talysh and Gilak people and the Azeris? Between Persians and other ethnic groups? Nine out of 10 Iranian metropolises are multiethnic and more than 90 percent of Iranian provinces are multiethnic too. The small province of North Khorasan, with a population of less than 900,000, is home to more than seven ethnic groups. Partitioning Iran along clear ethnic lines is not possible without bloody wars that would leave hundreds of thousands dead and displace tens of millions. If such wars began, there would be little prospect of ending.

Since ancient times and throughout history various secessionists have made their case,  but none of them have ever succeeded even on a small scale: Iran remains intact. Whatever territory Iran has lost has been the result of military invasions or pressures from great powers, not because of the efforts of secessionists. Over the last century, at three important junctures — the two world wars and the Islamic Revolution — when the central government was weak and decayed, secessionists stepped up their campaigns. But none of these movements succeeded in breaking off or reclaiming even a tiny portion of Iranian territory.

Partition has not even taken place in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan, which have been scenes of frequent civil wars, and seen governments crumble several times. In Iraq, during the last decade of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st, the central government was weak and fell twice, but still, the country was not partitioned. Even Iraqi Kurds, who had achieved autonomy after half a century of heroic struggle, did not manage to secede from Iraq and create a new country. And today, even if the central government in Baghdad was destroyed, the Kurds would not be able to create a new country. At most, if their tribal divisions would allow it, they would be able to create a small and landlocked country set apart from two or three provinces in northern Iraq, but they would not be able to incorporate the important Kurdish city of Kirkuk into this potential new country. Without a central government in Baghdad, Kurds, Turkmen, Sunni Arabs and Shia Arabs would fight each other over this oil-rich region so fiercely and for such a sustained period of time, probably leading to many thousands of dead bodies. But for many Iranians, it is difficult to accept this truth and the idea of giving up the idea of drawing new borders, especially borders drawn on ethnicity.

 

Yes to Decentralization, No to Federalism

If various people linked to politics and society in Iran are troubled by discrimination and the centralization of power and wealth in the country and if, because of this concern, they have fallen into the trap of ethnic nationalism and advocate federalism, then they must be edified. First, it is worth pointing out that in Iran, even under the Islamic Republic, ethnicity is not necessarily the basis of discrimination and an Iranian citizen is not discriminated against merely because of his ethnicity. Discrimination in Iran is based on five factors: (1) religion, (2) gender, (3) ideology, (4) distance from the capital and (5) the corruption of the ruling class. None of these factors have anything to do with ethnicity. Any Iranian, from any ethnicity, has the ability to gain wealth and power if he is a Shia Muslim, is faithful to the ruling ideology and has access to the centers of wealth and power.

Iran is a vast and diverse country and cannot exclusively managed from the center or run by a system that focuses on this sort of management. On the other hand, in Iran today, federalism has no relevance because federalism is a product of a union between neighboring states or quasi-states and a commitment to form a new country. It is not the result of the partition of an existing country. In addition, federalism was not invented to fight discrimination or even with the intent of decentralizing power. Federalism and decentralization are two totally separate issues.

The solution to these debates could be simple. When all the administrative affairs of a country are managed by a centralized bureaucracy, its government gets bigger — and corruption and discrimination follow. The first step to solve this problem is to reduce the size of the government by giving more authority to local institutions such as city and village councils, municipalities and provincial governments. In legal discourse, a mayor is considered the “president” of his city and enjoys vast powers within that city but, unfortunately, in Iran, even the most trivial issues are managed from the centralized government, and local institutions enjoy little authority and have limited duties.

It appears that to disperse bureaucratic powers and to increase efficiency, Iran would need something akin to the bill introduced by the government of Prime Minister Haj Ali Razmara [a lieutenant general who was assassinated 1951 by a religious fanatic], which set out to create provincial and local councils. In terms of rules of jurisprudence and writing laws, this was a satisfactory bill and, with edits, this could work as a solution for the current times. But, in the 16th Parliament [beginning in 1949], Mohammad Mosaddegh [later prime minister] and his supporters accused Razmara of trying to “break up Iran” with this bill, although many, including this author, believes that General Razmara was one of the most patriotic military men in Iran, had a deep knowledge of Iran and his people, and his 20-volume book, the Military Geography of Iran, is still being taught in military academies in Iran.

Another solution could be increasing the number of Iran’s provinces. A country like Turkey, with a population equal to Iran’s but half the size of Iran, has 84 provinces. Iran’s big and populous provinces could be divided gradually, with the aim of managing them better and with more justice. And how these provinces are divided should be determined by their size and their population, not ethnicity, religion, language or anything else. In other words, it is possible to create smaller provinces centered around a few cities and rural districts, and provincial governors would be able to run for office the under the supervision of popularly-elected provincial councils.

 

 

Mohammad Mohebi, Professor of Social Science, Tehran Azad University

 

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