Decoding Iran’s Politics: Will Rouhani and Trump Talk?

President Trump’s recent decision to oust his national security adviser, John Bolton, has prompted a number of Iranian news websites and Iran-based media outlets to conclude that the chances for Tehran-Washington talks might have increased. They have paid special attention to signals from Washington that this could be the case. 

For instance, some Iranian media have pointed to a September 10 Washington Post article that indicated that John Bolton had opposed Trump’s desire to meet Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in an effort to strike a new nuclear deal. This article quoted an unnamed US official who said that in June 2019, following Trump’s decision not to order a military attack on Iran after it downed an unmanned US drone, Bolton had been “devastated.” 

At the same time, remarks made by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on September 10 have been widely covered in Iran, especially his assertion that President Trump could meet with President Rouhani at the upcoming United Nations meeting with “no preconditions.”

These speculations have emerged over recent weeks as ambiguity over the prospects of direct talks between Iran and the US has increased. 

In one of the latest developments, Donald Trump signalled on September 5 that a meeting with his Iranian counterpart at the upcoming UN General Assembly might be possible. Referring to Iran’s economic problems, Trump added: "We could solve it [their problems] in 24 hours."

But the US president took this stance just one day after he said he would not agree to the condition laid out by President Rouhani that the US drop sanctions before talks begin. Ten days earlier, Hassan Rouhani had emphasized that any negotiation between Tehran and Washington would only take place on that condition, as well as the US agreeing to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the nuclear deal signed in 2015. 

 

Rouhani’s Unprecedented Position

Controversy over Tehran’s position on direct talks with Washington mounted when, on August 26, Rouhani implied he might be ready to talk to Trump, and said: : “If we know that holding a meeting will serve our [national] interests, we will not hesitate [to do so].” He added that even if there was a “10 percent chance for success," he would prefer to try. Given President Trump’s repeated calls for direct talks with the Iranian president, President Rouhani’s statement was interpreted, both inside and outside Iran, as a reaction to his American counterpart’s calls for negotiation.

Rouhani’s remarks were made a day after Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s trip to France to meet Emanuel Macron on the sidelines of the G7 summit in Biarritz. Zarif described his talks with Macron as "constructive." On the same day, Emmanuel Macron said at a press conference with Donald Trump that a French diplomatic initiative could lead to a meeting between the US and Iranian presidents “within a few weeks." 

However, just a day later, Rouhani took a completely different stance, stating that he would not meet Donald Trump. The Iranian president said on August 27 that Tehran would not change its attitude unless the US “repents” and lifts the economic sanctions.

In a similar statement on September 3, he repeated: “We have not intended and do not intend to hold bilateral talks with America at any time.” Rouhani emphasized that “the principles” of Iran’s foreign policy are outlined by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei.

 

Did Rouhani Want to Challenge the Leader?

Rouhani’s apparent flip-flop over holding face-to-face talks with Trump led to heated debates over the prospects of possible negotiations with the US, as well as about what the reason could be for the Iranian president to step down from his position stated on August 26. 

The most popular explanation for this change is that the Supreme Leader may have objected to Rouhani’s initial stance. The president’s September 3 emphasis on the ultimate role of Ayatollah Khamenei in decision-making for Iran’s foreign policy appears to be clear evidence for this theory.

The theory becomes even more substantial when one takes into consideration that, three days after Rouhani implied he would talk to his American counterpart, Ayatollah Khamenei’s official website republished a statement reminding people of the Leader’s severe opposition to holding talks with the US, which had initially been released on the same date the year before. During a meeting with Hassan Rouhani and his cabinet members on August 29, 2018, the Supreme Leader had said: “Negotiating with America is absolutely out of the question... not only for the president, but also for the foreign minister and [other] foreign ministry officials.” 

Given that it was not the first time that the Leader disapproved of negotiations with the Trump administration, the important question was: Why did Rouhani express his willingness to talk to the US president? 

One the one hand, Hassan Rouhani has already proved that not all of his remarks on Iran’s foreign policy are necessarily in line with the Leader’s position. For instance, a few months after the finalization of the 2015 nuclear agreement, known as the JCPOA, Rouhani suggested during his March 20, 2016 message to mark the Iranian new year that the Islamic Republic must plan for “JCPOA 2” in order to secure a high economic growth for the country. Rouhani’s remarks were widely interpreted as an indication of the Iranian regime’s decision to cooperate more closely with the West, including the US. However, the next day, March 21, 2016, Ayatollah Khamenei harshly criticized people he said were willing to “talk to America” in the name of “the JCPOA 2, 3 or 4” under the pretext of “solving people’s problems." The Leader described this idea as “dangerous,” as it could lead, in his opinion, to the Islamic Republic’s retreat from “supporting the nations of Palestine, Yemen and Bahrain” in exchange for a rapprochement with the US.

On the other hand, it is not  easy to imagine that Rouhani’s – indirect – announcement of his readiness to negotiate with the US president was an effort to challenge or bypass the Leader. One cannot forget that Rouhani’s August 26 statement was made after Javad Zarif’s trip to France to meet Emanuel Macron, where the latter clearly announced he was trying to broker a new deal between Tehran and Washington. As a result, it would be too simplistic to suggest that Hassan Rouhani’s unexpected stance was nothing but a spontaneous, uncalculated statement. It is also inperceivable that the Leader had not approved Javad Zarif’s trip to France during the G7 summit, which was made after his earlier trip to France, on August 22, to negotiate with Emanuel Macron.

In other words, Ayatollah Khamenei must have been aware of the ongoing efforts that were being made in France to reduce tensions between Tehran and Washington.  

 

Is Tehran Thinking about Possible Talks?

Based on the above facts, the Iranian president’s controversial statement on August 26 could indicate that the Leader and the president had  – at least – conversed about possible negotiations with the US government, but that Hassan Rouhani may have overestimated the extent to which the Leader would approve of holding new talks with the Americans.   

At the same time, the nature of Donald Trump’s reaction to Hassan Rouhani’s willingness to hold faceto-face talks might have played an important role in Rouhani’s backing off his initial position.

A few hours after the Iranian president’s remarks on August 26, Trump said in a joint press conference with Macron that he would be ready to meet in the coming weeks, if the “conditions” were right. He stressed: “In the meantime, they have to be good players... They can’t do what they were saying they’re going to do because if they do that, they’re going to be met with really very violent force.”

An uncompromising politician like Ayatollah Khamenei might have found such remarks quite threatening and in contrast with Donald Trump’s previous calls for talks with no “preconditions”. So it is possible that President Trump’s reaction to President Rouhani’s remarks has placed Rouhani under pressure to step down from his position.   

However, it also seems significant that Ayatollah Khamenei, despite his website’s republication of comments against negotiating with the US  last year, has not personally made any direct comments about Rouhani’s controversial remarks so far. Even if he reacts to the president’s remarks at some point in the future, his long delay may imply that his objections to negotiating with the Trump administration might have softened when compared with his previous absolute disagreement. 

And finally, the fact that Rouhani said “If we know that holding a meeting will serve our [national] interests, we will not hesitate [to do so], regardless of his later remarks, means that he personally believes in negotiating with President Trump. This reality might also imply that the Iranian president has been trying to convince the Leader to approve a new round of Iran-US talks, even if there is still no indication that he has been successful in getting Ayatollah Khamenei’s authorization for them. 

 

Read other articles in the series: 

Decoding Iran’s Politics:  What was Tehran’s Share of the Responsibility for the Iran-Iraq War?

Decoding Iran’s Politics:  The Concept of Revolution in Iran, 40 Years After 1979

Decoding Iran’s Politics: Iranians’ Concerns Over War