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Ex-Tehran Mayor: "If Iranian Reformism is Dead, Why Keep Kicking it?"

June 20, 2021
Aida Ghajar
19 min read
Gholamhossein Karbaschi, secretary-general of the Kargozaran Party, supported Abdolnasser Hemmati in Friday's presidential election
Gholamhossein Karbaschi, secretary-general of the Kargozaran Party, supported Abdolnasser Hemmati in Friday's presidential election
Some reformist figures such as Mehdi Karroubi took part in the vote, and encouraged others to do the same
Some reformist figures such as Mehdi Karroubi took part in the vote, and encouraged others to do the same
Mohammad Khatami, another well-known reformist, also cast a vote
Mohammad Khatami, another well-known reformist, also cast a vote
In the end Hemmati won 2.4 million votes compared to 3.7 spoiled ballots
In the end Hemmati won 2.4 million votes compared to 3.7 spoiled ballots

By the early hours of June 19, 2021, it was readily apparent that Ebrahim Raisi was going to be the eighth president of Iran. The “win” came amid a tussle between regime supporters and opponents; the former tried desperately to encourage people to participate, while the latter were mostly calling for a boycott on the basis that it would send a firm message of “no to the Islamic Republic”.

The 2021 presidential election was the first time that some core political factions inside Iran also presented non-participation as a meaningful political action. Voting, some politicians held, was implicitly endorsing the legitimacy of the whole system. But this was not a view shared by many of Iran’s reformists, who faced criticism after Saturday’s result for encouraging hesitant Iranians to cast their vote nonetheless.  

The day after the election, Raisi stepped down from the judiciary, where he has served for decades, and was transferred to the executive branch ahead of his inauguration as president of Iran later this summer. In the meantime, Iran’s reformists appeared to be divided not only on what ought to have happened, but where to go from here.

We spoke to Gholamhossein Karbaschi, secretary-general of the Kargozaran [Executives of Construction] Party, a heavyweight player on the council that coordinates the reformist faction within the Islamic Republic. He had announced that his party would support ex-Bank of Iran governor Abdoulnasser Hemmati in the election. In the end, according to the official results, Hemmati came in fourth place with 2.4 million votes – compared to 3.7 million spoiled ballots.

The transcript of the interview is as follows.

You are one of the reformists who encouraged people to vote in this presidential election. Now, given the election results, what do you think of the decision of those who agreed to participate? Many believe this election was not competitive and that some of the reformists who called for voting had miscalculated, and are now losing out.

Participation in elections is not always about winning, but a process by which a candidate may or may not win. Elections in Iran are something we must be careful not to lose. If the elections are shut down, we will go backwards.

For more than a century, people have dreamed of being able to intervene in the fate of the country by participating in elections. However, there may never be an election [in Iran] in the ideal sense of the word.

The fact that we use elections to assign the executive affairs of the country to a person through the people's vote is something we must always take care of, and not allow it to be closed down. If we do not value elections, the powerful circles may come to the conclusion that even without them, they can run the country with the programs that they deem appropriate.

You are talking about a ballot box that set up with approbatory supervision. On the other hand, not voting is being seen as an act of protest. Without comparison and merely as an example, when Emmanuel Macron was elected in France, he said in his victory speech: "I also heard the voices of those who did not vote." In the situation that exists in Iran, where many have protested against the way the elections are held and the political structures governing the country, by not voting, which ballot box are you talking about?

The Guardian Council is criticized both by reformists and even some principlists. In this election, even the leader himself criticized the way it dealt with the approval of candidates. This type of jurisdiction is certainly not ideal. The criteria may be different elsewhere in the world, but this is a process that we may one day be able to change legally.

Macron is a good example. "You should also pay attention to the ‘invalid’ votes and those who did not participate," Sazandegi newspaper write in its editorial today [Sunday, June 20].

This is a stage in elections and democracy. France is known as a cradle of freedom and as a developed country; hearing the voices of those who boycott is definitely part of an advanced democracy. Sovereign democracy is not just about the majority, but also about the voices of the minority.

But regarding the boycott in Iranian elections; if it’s a protest against the type of election and the candidate, that’s one thing, but if the boycott is a protest against  the whole of the system, I do not think the president-elect can take a stand against the opposition.

Opponents of the system do not increase or decrease with the performance of a president. Their concern is the transformation of the whole structure. Therefore, if this is to be considered an anti-structural boycott, you should not expect it to have a decisive effect and it will be dealt with in a different way. Bu,t if apart from the structure, they object to the manner in which the elections are held or the candidates being disqualified, they can vote for the opponent, and thus disrupt the plan within the framework. This is acceptable.

Within this same political structure, with reference to your own remarks, invalid votes came in second place [on Friday]. Many believe that these votes, in addition to the non-votes, indicate the illegitimacy of the Islamic Republic and show the opinion of the majority of Iranian society. Some even hold that in the absence of a referendum on the Islamic Republic, not participating in elections is the same as a "no" in a referendum.

Anyone can interpret anything according to their own discretion and political taste. No one judgment will be accurate as to who is right. Rather, it requires surveys and research, within the country. In other countries, people can comment in polls, but not in Iran.

The number of votes cast in these thirteen periods the Islamic Republic has fluctuated between 50 and 80 percent of the electorate. It cannot be said that in one period, if 50 percent did not participate, they were protesting against the whole system and demanding its overthrow – if, for example, participation reaches 70 percent in the next.

The second term of Mr. Hashemi [Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani]’s presidency and the 1997 elections saw such a difference: 25 percent more people voted. In the ninth and tenth elections, the number of participants also increased. The interpretation that a decreasing number of participants expresses opposition to the principles of the system is not correct.

In Mr. [Hassan] Rouhani's first term, inflation fell to below 10 percent, sanctions were lifted, new investment came in and foreign policy progressed. In the second term, his vote soared. The fluctuation of vote depends on the people's satisfaction with their social and economic conditions.

Even now, not all non-participation can be interpreted as political. Some people may want to show their opposition, but much of the dissatisfaction is with economic issues, the coronavirus pandemic and the issue of sanctions.

You say that not all the votes not cast can be interpreted as opposition to the whole structure governing Iran. What about parties?

In Hassan Rouhani’s second term, catastrophes such as November 2019, the Ukrainian plane [the downing of PS752 by the Revolutionary Guards] and management of the pandemic increased the dissatisfaction of the protesting sector and led to the boycott campaign. Do you not think that during this period, the protesters were disappointed with various political factions, especially the reformists, and that this campaign addressed these factions because of their inefficiency and inaction in fulfilling their promises?

All of these factors are impactful and could have formed part of people's frustrations. Certainly, if a faction like the reformists, which even in these circumstances have a definite vote of 12 to 15 percent in valid polls, had participated actively and coherently in the elections, and these disqualifications had not happened, and instead debates had not taken place between different reformist factions, the figures would definitely have been different.

In my opinion, the invalid votes, which are mostly blank votes, are those who wanted to participate in the elections in any way. Some may say these people were forced to participate, but now it is no longer the case that participation or non-participation affects the fate of the people. Those who participated wanted to say ‘This candidate is not the one we want and that our candidate has been disqualified.’ It was not sufficient for them to abandon the election.

Similarly, some figures protested against their disqualification, but when it came to election day, they came out and voted or encouraged others to vote. Like Mr. [Mehdi] Karroubi, who was strongly opposed to the disqualifications when we approached him privately or in the name of his family. But he strongly emphasized that this election was our only hope for peaceful change. These white votes cannot be interpreted as a boycott.

You mention Mehdi Karroubi. Some consider his encouragement to be the result of your conversations with him. Were there any talks between you and him in this regard?

Mr. Karroubi has always been exhorting people to participate in elections, even under restrictions. In his assessment, no matter how much we protest, we should not abandon the ballot box. According to him, this is the only legacy of the revolution that we should appreciate.

About two weeks before this election, I visited him and emphasized that the principle of the election was important and we should try not to remove it from our political space. As for him supporting Mr. Hemmati, I was not aware of it at all; I myself only heard his son quoting him on this in the media. Of course, I tweeted out a photo of him voting when I received it. Mr. Karroubi is not a person who can be impacted by anyone. The prerogative to run in any election is his call, more than any of us, even.

The actions of Mehdi Karroubi and Mohammad Khatami in ​​support of participating in this have been interpreted as a rift in the reformist camp and a decline in the faction’s overall clout, because other personalities such as Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mostafa Tajzadeh and Azar Mansouri boycotted it. What is your assessment of these divisions?

I do not know about Mr. Mousavi, who is under house arrest. These people sometimes express grievances; this time their grievances were directed at criticizing the disqualifications. I have doubts about their not participating in the elections in the news that was cited. He said he was with those who were saddened by the humiliation of the disqualifications. This is my impression. If you have any other news, I am not aware of it.

I read his sentence to you: "If the heresy of approbatory supervision continues, the name of the Islamic Republic of Iran will be meaningless in the not-too-distant future. While respecting all my compatriots, in such an unstable and ambiguous situation, as a minor player, I will stand with those who are fed up with the humiliating and engineered elections." Was that just a protest in the run-up to the election date?

You see, those who participated in this election and voted for Mr. Hemmati were also critics. I myself protested against the disqualification of nine reformist candidates, and have repeatedly mentioned it. There are two ways to express this criticism. Not voting means being adjoined with those whose problem was not just with the disqualifications. By voting for someone instead of not, we are more actively expressing our criticism. My impression of his statement was not that you should not participate, but that he expressed sympathy for the critics.

Even with this ambiguity, Mir Hossein Mousavi did not participate in the election in any event. In other words, he stood with those who did not vote.

He has not participated in all of the elections. His circumstances are also changing; I don’t remember whether he voted in 2013 or not. In any case, maybe he did not like the candidates or maybe it’s as you say. I am unable to judge. Everyone is free to vote or not to vote.

There was a long debate among the reformists over whether, if just one or two of the nine candidates were approved, they would participate. It cannot be said that Mr. Hemmati was astronomically far from those other nine people. It was over his political stance that some wanted to protest; otherwise, regarding the principle of elections, the message of the reformists was that everyone is free to participate or not participate.

You think there is no divide?

There is discord; this is a group of 31 political parties that ultimately differ in their modes of expression, their criticism, their debates, and their policies. There will have been political differences between the Kargozaran, the Etemad-e Melli Party or the Etehad Party, but in the elections we were supposed to create a front that would.

The principle of forming this front, which received permission from the Ministry of Interior, was to participate in the elections. In the nomination of candidates, if one of the nine people was approved, they would participate, because some parties had banked on the same candidates. They do not have substantive differences, but political criticism and debate have always been present from the very beginning of the reformist bloc.

In your remarks, you repeated one point: the idea of a joint candidate from among the reformist factions. Many believe that after Mohammad Khatami and Mir Hossein Mousavi, the bloc does not have a prominent figure who has the charisma to attract votes and the attention of the ‘grey’ segment. Why? Is there no prominent figure or has no-one been trained up in all these years?

When a person is a charismatic figure in the eyes of critics and the domestic opposition, he can create charisma for members of the bloc and his own party. But when he goes to extremes, he is criticized by the Guardian Council and his credentials may not be approved.

That is why there are problems and paradoxes within the reform movement during the electoral process. In order to find a place in public opinion, he [a candidate] must believe in the Constitution and have at least some practical commitments. A critic of the Constitution may be attractive to some political parties, but in the eyes of the ruling powers, such a person cannot be approved.

At the time of the election between Mr. Khatami and Mr. [Ali Akbar] Nategh Nouri, they said that Nategh Nouri was going to be the president, but the leftists moved in such a way that Khatami came to power instead. In this election, it was propagated that everything had been set up so that Mr. Raisi would definitely become president.

If the reformist movement takes a consistent approach and then fails to nominate its candidate in a positive way, it negatively impacts the system. If we can mobilize the public to vote, and if we can repeat this action over several consecutive terms, the Guardian Council and other state institutions will gradually come to the conclusion that the disqualification system is not working – and perhaps will fix these problems through electoral law and the Council’s own regulations. It is true that in the reformist camp, we do not currently find anyone who we think would gain a high vote in wider society.

Let's go back to the election and its result. Both the government and the boycotters consider themselves the winners. Before the result was announced, Fars News Agency’s headline was that the “Vote No” campaign had failed. Those who called for boycotts believed they had been successful because of the low turnout. Where does the reformist faction stand on this duality? And many believe that the pro-election reformists failed this time. Do you believe in failure at all?

No. If they have failed, why should they be kicked again? You do not kick the dead. If the reformist movement or the pro-election movement has failed, why do both the victorious movement within the regime and Fars News Agency and the boycotters criticize further participation?

Because they think that the defenders of participation have made a strategic mistake in doing so, and have instead collaborated with the ruling power.

Well, if it has failed, then it's over. I think there has been no victory on the part of either of these two groups. The winner is Mr. Raisi, with 17 to 18 million votes.

But the fact that the turnout has fallen from 80 percent to 48 percent is not a success for right-wingers either. With the right design, even in this election, we could have won with 30 million votes. That is, with a person on whom both parties could count.

At present, the votes Mr. Raisi gained are the same as in 2017 [when he lost to Rouhani]. That is,  a fixed vote of between 20 and 30 percent belongs to principlists. The government may blame coronavirus for the scattered votes and four million blank votes and low turnout, but part of it is also due to social and political dissatisfaction.

On the other hand, others did their best to reduce the number of participants by 20 to 25 percent, which is natural, as I said. But we are where we were: that is, we are a group that believes in peaceful change and leading the country to better conditions through the ballot box.

Many reformists have already taken on the propaganda slogans of the opposition faction. Now, any principlist who wants to win votes and be respected in the eyes of the people must use the same reformist slogans. That is, they must discuss inflation, foreign relations, welfare and economic development, and so on.  

I and others like me may retire, or be unsuccessful. But the reformists’ agitation for change and development through the ballot box is a progressive stance to take in the country. The general public does not want disruption, such as foreign aggression, external economic pressure, or chaos and the disintegration of Iran.

This reformist faction you speak of, which you say is where it always has been and which you describe as progressive – what practical plans do you have today, with Ebrahim Raisi as President?

As you know, unfortunately, the reformists are only united during the election campaign season. The fact is that each of the parties is preparing its own programs and we have not yet been able to present one manifesto, as one united front. Perhaps, if there had theoretically been unity in this election, we would have gained more consensus.

We in the Kargozaran Party have prepared a detailed plan in terms of future economic and infrastructural actions. We believe it will take not just one presidential term but the next 20 years to reorganize the country, its tinfrastructure and industries, the petrochemical and gas sectors, railways and highways. This is a detailed program that I will not discuss in this interview. It may not be approved by all the other parties.

What will we do about this government? Naturally, every faction has the same attitude towards the ruling party as the late Mr. [Mehdi] Bazargan used to say: "I was sitting at the table to eat, a cat came and I gave him a bit of food. He ate it and continued moaning. I gave him more and he moaned. I gave all the food to him and said 'Now I moan.'"

The reformists were in power once, and they were criticized. Now the situation has reversed and another political wing has come to power. The criticizing faction is constantly criticizing, and creating different issues that the ruling power can either pay attention to or not, and will use it in campaigning in another four years’ time. If proposals are not implemented, it prepares the ground for the next election.

Many consider this election as a turning point in the Islamic Republic and preparation for a change of the governance structure. At present, the presidency, parliament, and government institutions are unified [in their political approach]. In your opinion, what awaits the Islamic Republic and the reformist program in the short and medium term?

For the Islamic Republic, there are two options. Either they can  meet the needs of the country with an executive program – the government, the parliament and the judiciary, which now have the same tastes, should resolve the country’s problems because there is no opposition – and if they can, that’s very good. But if they fail, there will be grounds for dissatisfaction and trouble.

Either way, we hold elections every two years. The parliamentary elections are in two years’ time, and if the problems are not resolved, the people will not trust this parliament again, so the opposition will come to power and the government will have to adjust. Just like now; issues stemming Mr. Rouhani's weaknesses have attracted the people to this government.

So you do not believe this election is different to others? Even as many have raised the notion of the "second step of the revolution" mentioned in the speeches of the Supreme Leader?

The second step of the revolution is the ongoing programs in the country. Like every year, the plan is to increase production, remove barriers and improve people’s wellbeing. I do not know what plans this government has for achieving what it has defined as the "second step”.

The current parliament, in its first phase, wanted to change the structure of the budget; but not only did the structure not change, it added to the deficit. Or in other instances, they said they wanted to drop their dependence on oil, but none of these wishes were fulfilled. The first step is to meet the material needs of the people, of whom, according to statistics, up to 60 percent are living below the poverty line.

If the new government can take a step in this direction, that will be ideal. But the prediction is that, given the internal and external constraints, the manpower situation, the active working population... One cannot simply assume this will be resolved within the next four years. In the principalists camp, too, there may be differences of opinion and divisions, just as there is between reformists and principalists. If the government wants to be pragmatic, it has to address the needs of the people, which have requirements they have to act on.

Related coverage:

Ebrahim Raisi's Victory Signals Darker Days Ahead for Iran

Dispatch from Tehran: "These Aren't Elections. They Can Get Lost"

Reformist Leader Expects "Less Than 25 Percent Turnout" in Presidential Election

Abdolnasser Hemmati: Runaway Hit or Too Little, Too Late?

Firebrands, 'Rentals' and Has-Beens on Reformists' 2021 Candidate List

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