Ahmad Shirzad is a prominent analyst of Iran's nuclear program, a physics professor at Isfahan University, and a former member of parliament under the tenure of President Mohammad Khatami, from 2000-2004. In an interview with IranWire, he said that if the West is inclined, there are technical solutions for ending the Iranian nuclear crisis. Shirzad criticized present nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili's style of diplomacy, saying that a negotiator “does not only negotiate with the foreign side, but also performs actively inside the country,” adding that “the negotiating team must definitely be changed.”
Dr. Shirzad's critique of Iran's handling of its nuclear program extends back to 2006, when he told the Italian newspaper La República: “Those who speak of national interests are in no way familiar with nuclear technologies and only open their mouths for demagoguery.” Shirzad cautioned against getting too excited by Hassan Rouhani’s election, and said that the clock cannot be reset to the pre-2005 state of affairs. Despite this, he remains optimistic and believes that Rouhani's “hard core,” the president-election's goodwill and motivation to succeed will give him a strong chance of solving Iran's political, economic, and social issues.
After the election many groups and individuals have raised demands they wish Hassan Rouhani to address as president, including attention to civil-political rights, solutions for the country's economic problems, an easing of sanctions, and a resolution to the nuclear issue. How realistic and constructive can such early demands be?
I think the situation is not one where there is room for excitement. An eight-year trend has been stopped and is changing. But it’s not like everything will return to how it was pre-2005. It won’t happen like that. There are a lot of obstacles in Mr. Rouhani’s way, and basically Mr. Rouhani has not come for a political entanglement. He tries more to deal with issues through negotiation, lobbying, and discussion. He will try to manage the existing conditions based on the existing situation. In fact he is not one to be looking to challenge things.
During the election, people repeatedly expressed demands such as the release of political prisoners. Considering the conditions you mentioned, how realistic is it to expect Rouhani to meet these demands? Whenever Mr. Ahmadinejad was asked such questions, he would always say that the Iranian Judiciary is independent, basically shrugging off responding or taking action.
I think he has more goodwill for solving issues, and through his intelligence and political experience, he knows that the key to solving the country’s problems lays in establishing peace internally and reducing friction internationally. At the same time, I personally believe that Mr. Rouhani is interested in portraying the image of an effective manager. We all know that economic and operational problems don’t have short-term solutions. Therefore if Mr. Rouhani is looking to establish a successful image of himself, he can achieve it through political issues.
If he is able to reduce some of the impasses and restrictions that have been imposed for some individuals inside the country, especially those who are in prison, he will certain project a positive image of himself. He is motivated. But sooner or later, we might hear the same Ahmadinejad sentence from him, saying that the Judiciary is independent and that he cannot interfere in its affairs. I emphasize that he has both more goodwill about these issues and more motivation. But I don’t believe he has sufficient implementation tools for such a task. The only tool Mr. Rouhani has is this same social pressure. Surely if social pressure and the expression of demands such continue, they might be able to lead to some results on the political level through Rouhani. But if social pressure faces disappointment and frustration, Mr. Rouhani won’t be able to do anything, either.
Mr. Rouhani argued during his campaign that the nuclear program could be advanced in a manner that doesn't involve the imposition of costly sanctions. Given the state of the economy and the situation Iran faces, this argument appealed broadly to Iranians and encouraged many to vote for him. Based on your knowledge of nuclear technology, do you see a solution that would allow Iran's nuclear dossier to be cleared of sanctions but that would also allow Iran to continue its program without creating international challenges?
I believe there certainly is a solution. Of course most of it will depend on the flexibility of the Western countries. I mean if the West's issue is really nuclear weapons, and they are not after putting political pressure on the Iranian regime through this issue, there are various solutions. These solutions also existed in the past. It is still possible for the Iranian government to maintain its dignity and for Western countries to be assured of the non-military nature and safety of the Iranian nuclear program. Building trust through different kinds of monitoring and cooperation is possible. The issue of a consortium, which had been discussed before, is still possible through a fuel exchange plan. Technologically, different things can be done. But for the most part, this depends on the Western side’s flexibility and the Iranian side’s sense of trust. If on both sides there is a will to reach a stable solution, it is possible to solve the issue.
What can Mr. Rouhani do that Mr. Saeed Jalili did not do? Jalili also said that he was interested in mutual respect and keeping Iran’s nuclear program.
Mr. Jalili was a unilateral negotiator. He only relayed messages from one side to the other, and the other side did not accept it. An effective negotiator, two of whom we have seen in Iran—Ali Larijani and Mr. Rouhani himself— does not only negotiate with the foreign side, but also performs actively inside the country. The negotiating team must definitely be changed. An active team with influence inside the country, one that has a will to solve the issue, must replace it. Such a team can act as an effective agent to get leaders of the Islamic Republic closer to an agreement with others. To be sure, this figure cannot be someone at Mr. Jalili’s level. The types of Mr. Ali Larijani or Hassan Rouhani were successful. I think that under the current circumstances, someone like Mr. Velayati can be much more successful; someone who believes in solving the issue, not someone who just goes back and forth. In order to do this he will have to also perform vigorously inside Iran.
What responsibility to sanctions have for the country’s present economic disarray? Some argue that sanctions have only had limited impact, others say they've been extremely detrimental.
They have definitely been effective and their effects have been serious, too. But it is also inaccurate to think that the sanctions alone have had an impact on the country’s poor economic conditions. The mismanagement and incompetence of the government’s economic officials and their from-one-day-to-the-next management style has exacerbated these issues. With Iran facing such a significant issue in the world, [these officials] did strange and unmeasured things inside the country that exacerbated things. But can this change the country’s foreign policies in the short term? It is not easy to answer this question. It depends on what path the government authorities choose. Do they wish to choose a path through which the country’s economy would be better managed, or are they willing to accept economic losses so that they would not compromise their foreign policy? It is a strategic decision in which the government is not the only effective factor.
During the election debates, Mr. Velayati referred to some capacities that have not yet been used in resolving Iran's foreign policy crisis. How possible is it for people like former presidents Khatami or Rafsanjani, or other individuals who can build trust, to be used in foreign policy?
I don’t believe Mr. Hashemi or Mr. Khatami are able to play a role in this area. They are not in conditions to do so. But Mr. Velayati himself, or others who have more influence inside the Iranian ruling group, can be effective. Mr. Rouhani is also effective, of course, even though he will not be involved in the initial stages. The chief negotiator will have to be a high-ranking diplomat who is able to play an effective role. I believe the suitable candidate for this job is Mr. Velayati himself.
There has been much discussion over the past two weeks as to whether Mr. Rouhani is a reformist or a conservative. Looking at his political past and listening to his recent campaign speeches, it’s still difficult to say what sort of thinking or demands he represents. What are your thoughts?
These definitions will become clear over time. Perhaps nobody could have ever imagined that Mr. Rafsanjani would be called a reformist at some point. But as we saw Mr. Rafsanjani slowly took steps in a path less expected. Eight to ten years ago, nobody would have expected these positions and conduct. If we look at the way Mr. Rouhani has evolved, we can see that he had a positive role in the nuclear case. But from a traditional viewpoint and based on the categorizations of the past decade, he would not be considered a reformist. He is a member of Tehran’s Combatant Clergy Association, whereas the reformist clerics were in the Association of Combatant Clerics. As such, traditionally, he has never been in the reformist camp. But his behavior and conduct in the past have always been moderate and middle-of-the-road. If you note the positions he took during his presidential campaign, you will see that his positions were a lot closer to the reformist positions. His performance, speeches, and positions will determine the rest.
Do the limited speeches and positions we saw from Mr. Rouhani over the recent days demonstrate such reformist tendencies?
So far, during the few days that have passed since the election, he has not disappointed his voters. Even in these few days, his impact on the political, economy, and social arenas has been positive, too. But we must see how these effects can be stabilized. I think the strategic decision that will show itself over the coming weeks will be his choice of cabinet members, even though the reformists do not wish to have a share of cabinet positions. But Mr. Rouhani is also expected to make productive and positive choices of people who can take the country forward with positive steps. So we must wait and see his choices for managing the country, and what he is planning to do in practice.
What ministries can play a more pivotal role in defining his path?
From what we hear here and there, he is not free to pick the best resources. But this is a key turning point. He is going through sensitive days. To be sure, choices he will make for key cultural ministries such as Culture and Islamic Guidance, Science and Technology, and Education and Development will be pivotal and will determine his future path more clearly. For example, if the approach he wishes to take about the universities is a continuation of procedures and programs pursued in [ Ahmadinejad’s] Ninth and Tenth Cabinets, the universities will be in trouble. It is expected that there will be reforms in this area and for us to go back to the usual practices that were in operation before. We also need serious changes in Education and Development [Ministry].
In which ministries can these effects show themselves faster?
The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance is a ministry where many key decisions can be observed, before they are even visible in society. In cultural areas we must see who Mr. Rouhani’s choices are and how the entire cabinet wishes to operate together. Perhaps the easiest area for him would be the economy, because the country’s senior managers, whether reformist or conservative, are a lot more coordinated in this area. But economic developments don’t show themselves quickly, and it will take about two years for the wheels of the economy to start moving. In political and cultural issues, his hands are a lot more tied. Then again, if he wants to do things that will make people happy, he can satisfy people a lot more easily in these areas. We will have to wait to see which political game plan Mr. Rouhani will use to make his entrance.
How much obstructionism can we expect from the “resistance groups” that were active during Mr. Khatami’s presidency, the groups that effectively blocked his political, cultural, and social reforms? Considering the differences between Mr. Rouhani and Mr. Khatami and their political origins, how effective can these forces be in barring the implementation of Mr. Rouhani’s programs in response to people’s demands?
I think that the most sensitive issue is this one. What you call “resistance groups,” I call “the hard core,” a phenomenon that emerged during the Khatami era in 1997. If that hard core wishes to rebuild its violent self as it did in 1997 and employ the same methods of pressure groups and special crackdowns – essentially operating outside the reach of the government – that were manifested as “one crisis every nine days” during the Khatami era, the conditions will be very difficult and we can’t be too hopeful.
Are you pessimistic?
I am not pessimistic. I think that repeated experiences and the eight-year reign of Mr. Ahmadinejad have made everyone alert. Though rightists don’t wish to relinquish power, the main bulk of their power has transformed and paled. What behavior those resistance groups or hard core groups wish to display in the political realm, and whether they wish to rely on their traditional power tools or if they wish to have a more transparent presence in the political atmosphere, are subjects we must wait and see.
But the most important factor that can determine whether Mr. Rouhani himself can be successful or not is in this area, and no one knows how this area will play out. The optimistic answer is that the hard core groups take to transparent political activities and form parties and groups. The pessimistic answer is that the same “one crisis every nine days” scenario will be repeated again. Certainly it is not right to think that their way of thinking has disappeared. The other side got four million votes. If those who represent those votes take to transparent political party activities and have their own media outlets and compete with the other side, we can be hopeful that all developments will take place in the political arena.
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