Since 2003 and the US-led invasion of Iraq, the Middle East has seen a dramatic aggravation of sectarian rhetoric and violence. The brutal and indiscriminate sectarian cleansing of Sunni-Shia neighborhoods in Baghdad throughout 2006 and beyond is still vivid in many of our minds. However, since the spate of historic uprisings across the Arab world which began in December 2010 and specifically the onset of the Syrian civil war and the gruesome levels of carnage witnessed there, the issue and discourse of sectarianism appears to not only have become more vitriolic and malevolent, but to have spread and engulfed much of the broader region. From the prominent preacher Yusef Al-Qaradawi calling for a Sunni jihad against Iran in Syria, to the lynching of four Shia in Abu Musallim in Greater Cairo on June 23, inter-sectarian tensions and mutual suspicion are at an all-time high, with enormous consequences spanning from North Africa to Pakistan.
In this interview we spoke to two noted experts for their views on this most inflammatory of subjects and their thoughts as to the reasons why the ‘sectarian factor’ has become such a burning issue across the Middle East. Sajjad Rizvi teaches Islamic Intellectual history at the University of Exeter, and has consulted various governments on sectarian relations in the Middle East and South Asia and Fanar Haddad is a research fellow at the Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore, and has previously lectured at the University of Exeter and served as a research analyst at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
In Part One of the interview they discuss how sectarianism reflects the so-called ‘cold war’ between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the role of pan-Arab media networks, and whether the Grand Ayatollahs and Al-Azhar are pro-active in trying to stem the tide of violence.
In Part Two, to be published tomorrow, they examine the influence of Iran's regional involvement in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq on the rise of sectarianism, and the Islamic Republic's motivations in backing Bashar Assad's regime.
What factors have contributed to the sectarian discourse gaining traction today? For instance, it wasn't too long ago that Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, was touted as one of the most popular men in the region. Today he is seen as an increasingly polarising and divisive figure.
Sajjad Rizvi: Tension around identity politics defined by community has indeed been growing in recent years. But insofar as sectarianism is symptomatic of political conflicts and systematic state and inter-state dysfunction, it is clear that the key driver of the Shia-Sunni tensions in particular is the cold war between the Saudi and Iranian states, exacerbated by the new situation that has developed in Iraq since 2003. The effect of the August 2006 [Israel-Hezbollah] war was short-lived not least because of the civil war in Iraq (and especially the battle for Baghdad) that had a spill-over effect on the Gulf with rising tensions that exploded in the forms of the popular upheavals in both Bahrain and the eastern province of Saudi Arabia that were defined as ‘Iranian-backed’ Shia agitations. The effect of Iraq was to encourage those movements in Eastern Arabia that represented communities who had suffered discrimination and marginalization to make bolder demands for rights – and especially for the basic dignity that a citizen should enjoy. And now with the so-called Arab spring, sectarianism is rampant – the very way in which some revolts are legitimized and not others makes that clear when leading figures in the region such as the cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi embrace and champion the Egyptian, Syrian, Libyan, and Tunisian rebels while dismissing the Bahraini and Saudi protestors as mere Iranian agents.
What is most disturbing is how sectarianism is reflected in the media and through it comes into people’s living rooms. On the one hand Al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya as major sources of ‘news’ promotes a certain view of the world, and on the other al-Alam and Press TV represent an Iranian view. Even sitcoms and historical dramas play a role – one thinks back to Ramadan 2012 when the series on Umar was widely seen as a robust Sunni response to the many Iranian serials such as the one on Mukhtar – historical figures of the past as Sunni and Shia champions respectively made to play out vicariously a conflict that is all too real in the present.
Fanar Haddad: Sectarian identity has been an issue of fluctuating relevance for those nation-states that have a ‘sectarian issue’ – places like Iraq, Lebanon or Syria. However, when taken as part of the century or so of Middle Eastern statehood, there does seem to be something new about the sectarian entrenchment witnessed today. I think this novel and dangerous sectarian landscape is the product of three interrelated and overlapping factors: firstly, the political change in Iraq in 2003 that empowered Shi’a Iraqi political forces thereby arousing the wildest of sectarian fears and ambitions and according sectarian identity unprecedented political relevance.
The second factor is the emergence of new media and new forms of communication, organization and expression. This has critically shaped the impact and repercussions of the political change in Iraq. The two factors evolved simultaneously: 2003 saw the political and social earthquake that was regime change in Iraq; in 2004, Facebook was born; in 2005 YouTube came online followed by Twitter in 2006. The empowerment of Shi’as in the Arab world was always going to be controversial just as the emergence of such revolutionary forms of communication and the drastic devolution of communicative power were always likely to have serious sociopolitical reverberations. For the two to coincide can almost be viewed as a cruel joke.
The previously mentioned sectarian hopes and fears produced by regime change were amplified, magnified and broadcast across the Arab world helping sectarian identity become the dominant prism through which Iraq is viewed and ensuring that the drivers of sectarian entrenchment would come as much from below as from above. Finally, in addition to Iraq 2003 and new technologies and social media, I would add the perhaps consequent ongoing processes through which new political and social orders are being born in the Middle East: after a century or so of failed nation building, the contradictions of the Arab nation state and of society are being challenged; it is in this context of a search for a new order that the future of Sunni-Shi’a relations in the Arab world needs to be seen.
Whilst one would be ill-advised to try to predict where this is all heading, I think the effects of the past ten years on sectarian identity and sectarian relations thus far are very clear: firstly, sectarian dynamics are more regional than ever before (meaning they are transnational and not confined to any single context); secondly, they are more religious (meaning that sectarian dogma, and not just sectarian identity, is being used to mobilize people more than ever before); and finally, sectarian dynamics are more grassroots and driven from below in a manner unprecedented in the age of the Arab nation-state.
Why is a long tradition of ecumenicism or inter-sectarian dialogue and unity increasingly finding itself overshadowed?
Rizvi: Ecumenism was always a rather minor tendency since states seem to thrive on conflict far more than cooperation. Even the major ecumenical movement of the 1950s was primarily about the warmer relationship between Iran and Egypt, both monarchies at the time whose relationship was cemented by marriage. In more recent times, ecumenical efforts – at least to delegitimize violence against the other – such as the Amman Message of 2005 have really become dead letters as signatories have withdrawn their support and as the realities of politics on the ground have obviated their efficacy; despite the fact that this proposal was put forward by the Jordanian monarchy, it was in fact King Abdullah II who did much to fuel tensions by talking about a ‘Shia crescent’ threatening to emerge connecting Iran through to Lebanon. Iraq posed the first challenge, and now Syria seems to destroy any chance of a re-emergence of ecumenism at a time when state policy is seen as sectarian regardless of any evidence. For example, while those who attack the regime in Damascus, Iran and Hezbollah use increasingly anti-Shia and rather derogatory if not abusive language, the actions of their opponents are clearly not motivated by the desire to protect some wider Shia alliance but rather national interest on the part of the Iranians who have so few friends in the region on the one hand and survival on the part of Hezbollah.
Haddad: I agree with Sajjad that the ‘tradition of ecumenism’ has been overplayed by many commentators. At the very least the term is rather confusingly deployed given its religious and doctrinal connotations: rather than ecumenism (which would imply understanding and acceptance of the other as individuals, sectarian groups and sectarian creeds) I would say that sectarian relations in the past were characterized by a benign mix of irrelevance and ignorance. I do not believe that previous generations had a better understanding of Shi’ism than is the case today nor would I equate the acceptance of Shi’as (as evidenced by intermarriage, amicable relations and so forth) with the acceptance of Shi’ism; rather I would say that for previous generations, Shi’ism, sectarian relations and sectarian identity were largely irrelevant to the majority’s perception of the social and political world around them.
Are we seeing both sides of the sectarian divide eager to provoke sectarian hostility, or is it fair to say that some prominent Sunni clerics are seizing the opportunity to pursue their own agenda? If so, what are the reasons behind their positions and rhetoric? Are they ideological, political, religious, or a mixture of all three?
Haddad: I suppose there are elements on both sides of the sectarian divide who feel that a confrontation is upon them and are thereby provoking sectarian hostilities by, at the very least, enacting a self-fulfilling prophecy. As for motives I would say that ideological, political and religious ones intermingle with each other and with other tangible and emotional factors (fear being an obvious one) to further nurture already inflamed sectarian identities and sectarian hostilities. I should also mention that in many cases there is no agenda being deliberately served; no malicious plot being hatched; rather, sectarian provocations sometimes reflect genuine convictions and beliefs. I am always skeptical of arguments that effectively seek to exonerate society by laying blame on clerics or politicians by according them the omnipotence enjoyed by a puppeteer over his dolls! I would argue that while elites are of course influential it is only within the limits of what is socially acceptable/popular at any given moment that they can operate. To put it another way, I can easily think of many examples from across the globe of elites, religious or political, inflaming already existing prejudices; however, I would struggle to find examples of elites creating prejudices.
Rizvi: There are deliberate attempts at provocation. The media networks play an important role. In the Gulf in particular, one notes the prevalence of anti-Shiism on Saudi controlled media who have a rather interesting strategy of using comperes and presenters from a Shia background. The Iranian media and al-Manar (Hezbollah’s main channel) also does much to champion those who stand up to the Saudis and focus on issues such as Bahrain, Syria and Yemen. While the senior Shia leadership in both Najaf and Qum are keen to distance themselves from attacking Sunnis and also from attacking historical figures held dearly by Sunnis – one thinks of the famous fatwas of Fadlallah and Khamenei against the cursing of historical figures, senior Sunnis have been disappointing: al-Azhar as the leading Sunni seat of learning has been fuelling anti-Shiism while condemning actual acts of violence as occurred in June in Giza. In other contexts, we can see the fringes of the Sadrist movement in Iraq more emboldened by their power and becoming more anti-Sunni in response to the sectarianism of the protestors in Anbar. All these processes are political in nature – but the theological foundations are important. Theology might provide the language and references for conflicts but these have been in existence for a long time. It is politics that defines the timing and ferocity of some of the expressions of sectarianism.
Do Sunni clerics such as Qaradawi, who is often depicted as a relatively moderate cleric, represent political interests that make themselves felt through sectarian rhetoric? In other words, is a political agenda driving their rhetoric, to which doctrine is largely incidental?
Rizvi: It is striking how Qaradawi has shifted his position – so much so as to regret the time he spent in ecumenism. It is important to remember that until very recent he was a key player in Qatar’s religious foreign policy that projected its Islamic legitimacy through the promotion of the Muslim Brotherhood abroad and a strong tradition of Islamism that is reflected in the person of Qaradawi and a more liberal face represented through their promotion of Tariq Ramadan in Europe. Qatar’s attempt at becoming a major player in foreign policy especially over Syria has led them to articulate their position in anti-Shia terms and hence the shift in Qaradawi’s rhetoric is very much to be expected. In many ways, Qatar is competing with Saudi Arabia in playing the anti-Shia card. Of course, it remains to be seen whether the new Emir will continue to do so – or in fact take a more pragmatic line on Iran since ultimately anti-Shiism for them is really about putting pressure on Iran.
Haddad: Yes and no! On the one hand political interests and political perceptions are key to sectarian dynamics and I think Sajjad’s comments about Qatari and Saudi foreign policy and how this links to sectarian relations are totally on the mark. However, I would add that doctrine – or, more commonly, social perception – are not completely incidental. Qaradawi and his like (from both sides of the sectarian divide) may operate within the confines of what is politically expedient; however this in turn is restricted by what has social and/or religious purchase with regards to both the cleric’s own convictions and those of society.
Are Shi'a Grand Ayatollahs actively doing anything to stem the tide of sectarianism? Have they offered any tangible recommendations? Do they have the power and ability to contain and restrain more firebrand Shi'a clerics, who perhaps possess a more sectarian view of the tensions and conflicts presently afflicting the region?
Rizvi: There is plenty of evidence that this has been happening. The Grand Ayatollahs in Najaf have openly condemned anti-Sunni rhetoric and actions especially since the 2006 bombings of the shrine in Samarra and continue to do so. They organize joint prayers and issue direct fatwas concerning the inviolability of Sunni beliefs, practices and persons. But their influence does not extend everywhere – and did not stop the killing in the Iraqi civil war. The anti-Shia rhetoric and disproportionate killing is leading to more bold and brash preachers who are not so restrained whether in Lebanon or even in London. However, I would urge caution about giving such figures undue significance: much more needs to be done to urge al-Azhar and particularly the Saudi religious establishment to calm down the atmosphere.
Haddad: Yes they are issuing statements against sectarian division and yes the vast majority of Shi’a clerics do not engage in takfir – at least not in public. However, much of this is rendered rather superfluous given that few Shi’a clerics have spoken about Shi’a foreign fighters in Syria. One could argue that due to the limits on their influence (most starkly demonstrated by the Iraqi civil war) they have refrained from addressing an issue they know they cannot control. However one could equally argue that many of the Ayatollahs, like their Sunni counterparts, do see Syria in existential sectarian terms. Putting Syria aside, I think that most efforts or statements aiming at ecumenism over the past decade have been ineffective and, much like the ‘Amman Statement’ of 2004 or the ‘Mecca Agreement’ of 2006, have been proforma exercises in political correctness with little or no impact on a new sectarian landscape that some well-meaning elites still shy away from confronting.
What role are networks like Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiyya playing in fomenting sectarianism, and what does this reflect about Saudi Arabia and Qatar's political intentions?
Haddad: Al Jazeera and Al Arabiyya are doing with Syria what Al Jazeera did with Iraq in the years following regime change. There has been a rather shocking bias displayed and a complete lack of journalistic professionalism in the two networks’ coverage of the Syrian catastrophe. There is a chicken-and-egg dynamic at play here: are the two networks fomenting sectarian bias and sectarian stereotypes or are they in fact just reflecting (and inflating) common prejudices regarding the Syrian conflict, Shi’as and Iran? Whatever the case might be, pan-Arab media is certainly supporting the idea that the region is in a grand Sunni-Shia confrontation; this partially aligns with Saudi Arabian and Qatari objectives in that they will do their utmost to discredit Iran and any Iranian proxies in Syria and elsewhere in the Arab world. Intentionally or not however, the manner in which this has been done has led to the heightened stigmatization of Shi’as generally rather than just this political organization or that.
Rizvi: Al-Jazeera has become a caricature of itself – and its anti-Shia, and anti-Iranian bias affects the editorial policy across the board. Surprisingly it affects al-Jazeera English to a much lesser degree. Al-Arabiya simply acts as an unofficial voice of Saudi policy. There is no longer the pretense that the pan-Arab media reflects a neutral or even principled journalism. Even if one assumes that they are merely reflecting realities on the ground, there is little doubt that they are fuelling hatred and stereotyping of the Shia even more.
Do you think violence against Shi'as in countries such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia is undercovered in the media, and if so why?
Rizvi: Undoubtedly so – and one might add the general neglect of Bahrain in the Arab uprisings since 2011 (although in their case those protests effectively began in 2009). The question of neglect relates to what some networks might consider to be issues of interest to their viewership. It has in fact been difficult even at times to see newspapers engaging with shiakilling as it has now been termed and trended on twitter and so forth. In fact, in many cases it has been the influence of social media activists that have in some cases forced networks and other media outlets to take up the story not least because they do not wish to be seen as being out of the loop and out of the conversation.
Haddad: Absolutely. A more specific example than the ones mentioned in your question is the lynching of Hasan Shehata and three of his companions in Egypt last month. Frankly I was astonished by the lack of outrage at what was a unique episode of cruelty, violence and hate – even by the Middle East’s grotesque standards. It was unique in that the murders were perpetrated by an angry mob in a run-of-the-mill village rather than a militia in a warzone. It was one of the most purely sectarian acts of violence I have come across: there was no underlying power struggle or political or economic conflict here; Shehata and his companions were literally lynched because of their beliefs. And yet, despite the truly gruesome and abundant footage of the lynching Al Arabiya’s Arabic website neglected to cover the event at all despite having an extensive page dedicated to Egypt.
This selective coverage of sectarian issues is related to prejudice and bias. This often works both ways as was starkly demonstrated in Arab coverage (from Al Jazeera to Al Manar) of Syria and Bahrain. The callous denial of meaningful solidarity, sympathy and coverage to demonstrators in Syria and Bahrain in 2011 is a sorry reminder of the state of mainstream journalism in the Arab world today.
Sajjad Rizvi is Associate Professor of Islamic Intellectual History at the University of Exeter. He specialises in the philosophy of the Safavid-Mughal period and has also written on hermeneutics and contemporary Islamic thought and dynamics. He consults various government departments on issues of Islamic affairs, Iraq and the Gulf, and sectarian relations in the Middle East and South Asia.
Fanar Haddad is Research Fellow at the Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore. He previously lectured in modern Middle Eastern politics at the University of Exeter and at Queen Mary, University of London. Prior to obtaining his DPhil, Haddad was a Research Analyst at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office where he worked on North Africa. He has since published widely on issues relating to historic and contemporary Iraq. His main research interests are identity, historical memory, nationalism, communal conflict and minority politics. He is the author of Sectarianism in Iraq: Antagonistic Visions of Unity (London/New York: Hurst/Columbia University Press, 2011). His current research focuses on historical memory and narratives of state in the Middle East.
Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi is a final year doctoral candidate in Modern Middle East Studies at Queen’s College, University of Oxford, focusing on modern Iranian intellectual and political history.
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