Hardliners vs. Rouhani: The Culture Wars

Iran’s hardliners have stepped up their attacks on President Hassan Rouhani, and, increasingly, it’s the government’s culture policies that have come under fire.

In recent months, hardliners have developed a talent for using the cultural angle to their advantage. Not only have they demonstrated a strong recovery from the bruising defeat of last year’s presidential election, they have managed to extend their influence and build new alliances.

In late May, Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi appealed to Iran’s hardline coalition, the Islamic Revolution Stability Front, to monitor all cultural events and report anything that does not adhere to the values of the Islamic Republic.

Yazdi, an unapologetic opponent of democracy, commands considerable influence among hardliners. So it came as no surprise when, only days later, on May 27, MPs publicly criticized the Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance Ali Jannati, who had recently granted permission for a series of music concerts deemed to be “against Islamic standards.”

It’s not the first time Jannati has faced criticism. In December 2013, the MP Hamid Resai accused him of “laxity and permissiveness vis-à-vis insults to what is holy” and “promoting amoralism.” As a result, 105 MPs issued a “yellow card” against Jannati—essentially a warning, but, if followed up, could be the first step down the road to impeachment.

The Ministry of Culture and Guidance has been a particularly easy target for hardliners, primarily because they’ve been able to successfully link culture—from fine art to music to Islamic dress—to the moral fabric of the country. The tactic has been bolstered by the support of the Supreme Leader, who warned Rouhani and his administration not to be “reckless” when it came to matters of culture during an address to the Assembly of Experts in March. For many, this was interpreted as a signal to step up criticism. Rouhani, like Jannati, was accused of being too permissive and ushering in moral decay.

High-level clerics generally back conservatives when it comes to culture.  And hardliners do not tend to oppose those from their own camp either—on this, they are all unified, even if they disagree on other matters, such as nuclear negotiations or subsidies. One recent case in point is the pro-Hejab rally in Tehran, held in early May.

But attacks against culture policies are of course not hardliners’ only complaint: they have viewed Rouhani’s policies with open hostility, whether it’s foreign policy and nuclear negotiations, domestic matters or economic reform. In terms of the economy, conservatives have widely supported the views of MP Ahmad Tavakoli, who has accused Rouhani’s administration of corruption, and of engaging in a “sweetheart deal” worth 650 million euros, among other financial improprieties—further information, he said, will be released later.

Hardliners are doing their utmost to prevent the return of the reformists to executive positions. One example is the case of Abdolhossein Harati, who supported Mir Hossein Mousavi in the disputed presidential elections of 2009. He had been appointed director of the Center for Documents at Azad University but, after an intense campaign by hardliners, he was recently removed from his post. And, in addition to the pro-hejab rally, hardliners have organized protests and meetings designed to stall Rouhani’s foreign policy initiatives, including the “We Are Anxious” conference in May.

Yet, because Ayatollah Khamenei is broadly supportive of the nuclear negotiating team, hardliners have been forced to tread somewhat carefully.

Culture: Fair Game for Hardliners

Rouhani’s government has been relatively slow to respond to attacks against its cultural policies. On May 25, Jannati published an article in Iran newspaper, sarcastically entitled “We Are Anxious Too”, drawing a line between the government’s anxieties and those of the hardliner rallies, and accusing some media outlets of spreading false news and rumors. But he was less formidable when it came to issues of culture, retreating to the usual conservative line and arguing that they had as much concern over the importance of “chastity” and hejab in Iranian society as hardliners do.

He further sided with the hardliners on accusations of cultural invasion. “We are worried that the enemy is trying to destroy our national and Islamic identity by using every cultural tool and media and by promoting Western standards.”

Considering the makeup of Rouhani’s government and its past performance, such reactions are perhaps unsurprising. And, having identified the government’s Achilles’ heel, hardliners will use every weapon at their disposal to increase this vulnerability.

They control a wide and powerful range of media and have very active members in parliament, the Assembly of Experts and other centers of power in the Islamic Republic. They know how to organize support and, through successfully ousting critics from senior academic positions, have managed to secure considerable influence at prominent Iranian universities. And, by exaggerating any warnings that reformists might regain power—implying that a resurgence in support for the Green Movement reminiscent of 2009 could be on the horizon—they have engineered a marriage of convenience across the spectrum of hardliner politics.

Following Jannati’s May 25 editorial, hardliner website Raja News called the comments inexcusable, childish and clumsy on May 26. “Mr. Jannati,” it warned, “you better get the message before it is too late.” The warning—one among many—indicates that hardliners believe they have found just the right formula for challenging Rouhani. And, for its part, the government seems at a loss when it comes to mustering up the necessary ingredients to shift the terrain in its favor.