All Eyes on Soleimani

Ghasem Soleimani is back in Iran, and the media is ready.  Within hours of his return to the country on October 20, the commander of the Qods Force of the Revolutionary Guards was photographed at a memorial service for ground troops who lost their lives in the Iran-Iraq war. Most of Iran’s other high profile military officials were there, including General Mohammad Ali Jafari, the commander-in-chief of the Guards. But all eyes were on Soleimani.

In recent months, there has been ample coverage of Soleimani in Iraq: Iran’s most popular news sites, along with social media, have published images of the commander posing with Iraqi paramilitary forces, or “popular forces” as the Iranian media refers to them.

This is a new tactic for Iran, which has traditionally kept military operations under wraps, talking down Iran’s involvement in the war in Syria and connections to President Bashar al-Assad. Revolutionary Guards commanders have routinely claimed that Iran’s role in Syria was merely an advisory one.

But since the Islamic State’s insurgency has intensified, Iranian media has taken a different tack, casting Soleimani as a hero in Iraq and giving him credit for superior military leadership that led to the defeat of the Islamic State in Amreli. If it were not for Iranian intervention, they claim, Baghdad might have fallen to the insurgents.

This new tendency to put Soleimani in the limelight not only constitutes a shift in media management, it is part of a wider and rapidly-changing military strategy in Iran. Over the last year, Iranian officials have gradually become more transparent about Iran’s role in Syria and Iraq: Ayatollah Khamenei has spoken plainly about Iran’s ability to be effective against Islamic State, MPs have endorsed the Revolutionary Guards’ military presence in Syria, and the government has offered military assistance to Iraqi Kurds to fight off rebels. Seizing the opportunity to show off Iran’s political and military might, officials have surmised that Iran’s decisive intervention in the region can be a powerful tool in its dealings with not only its neighbors, but also the West. And Soleimani is a good way of encapsulating this strength.

Following yesterday’s memorial service, Soleimani spoke briefly with journalists, offering his analysis of the situation in the region and urging the media to look at the wider picture. In the end, he said, Islamic State forces will be defeated and pushed out of Iraq, just as US invading forces were eventually pushed out of the country. It is a parallel that Iran’s hardline media will be quick to exploit.

Savior, Hero, Pragmatist

Iran has now added Yemen and Bahrain to the list of countries where it believes it can exert direct influence, along with Syria, Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq. For the hardline media, it is easy to present Soleimani as a powerful reminder of this power and reach, the celebrated leader of Iran’s regional diplomacy, a hero who can turn the course of events towards Iranian interests.

In February 2012, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, denied that Iran had stirred up unrest in Bahrain; on the contrary, he said, “had we interfered in Bahrain the outcome would have been different.” Comments like this show Khamenei at his most confident, demonstrating the influence Iran commands over what happens in the region, but also how it might benefit Iranian interests. And Soleimani will be at the helm of any initiative Iran undertakes.

“The Saudis are worried sick that with developments in Yemen and the growth of opposition in Saudi Arabia, Commander Soleimani will be put in charge of Saudi matters,” Sadollah Zarei, a military analyst close to the Revolutionary Corps, told Fars news agency in an interview in mid-September.

Such speculation shows Soleimani’s influence on regional developments and gives some indication to his plans in the Middle East. “The revival of Shi’ism, with Iran as its focal point, gives Iran a centrality in political, security and economic aspects,” the commander said in February, speaking about the significance of Syria as battleground between Iran and its adversaries. “The Shia Crescent, they say, is not political. The Shia Crescent is economic and the most important economic question in the world is oil. We know that three countries in the world have the biggest petroleum reserves in the world: Saudi Arabia first, Iran second and Iraq third. Together these three countries hold almost 70 percent of the world’s oil. And 70 percent of the people in these countries are Shia.”

For Ayatollah Khamenei, a figure like Soleimani is crucial at this time: he needs a recognisable strongman, visible in the media and easy to adapt as a symbol of resilience, determination and strength. If the Islamic State succeeds in Iraq, Iran will be faced with the establishment of a Sunni state right next door, dashing hopes for Soleimani’s victorious Shia Crescent. It is a nightmare the Iranian leadership does not want to contemplate, and one that has spurred the commander to take a more public stance, projecting a strong, prepared military led by a man with a solid understanding of Iran’s history and a vision for its future.