The Saudi Cables and Iran: Part 2

On Saturday June 20, a day after the website WikiLeaks published a trove of Saudi foreign ministry confidential and secret correspondence, a Saudi foreign ministry spokesman warned Saudi Arabia’s citizens that they could face prosecution if they shared the documents.

The ministry urged citizens not to “help the enemies of the homeland” by sharing the documents, many of which it said were “clearly fabricated.”

Republishing the leaked material is an offence under the country’s cybercrime legislation, authorities said. People guilty of distributing the material could face up to 20 years in prison.  

The leaked documents cover a period of approximately 40 years. A considerable portion of the cables mention Iran and Saudi Arabia’s strategy for dealing with its rival neighbor. They also expose the Saudi authorities’ anxiety over the spread of Iranian influence in the region.

The majority of the documents consist of correspondence between Saudi embassies around the world and its foreign ministry. The cables include the names of a number prominent political figures from several countries, as well as information about these countries’ foreign policy agendas.

Abdullah Al-Ali, a Kuwaiti cyber security expert and the director of Cyberkov, a provider of security services, described the leaks as a “historic disaster” for Saudi Arabia.“A month ago, when there were cyberattacks against Saudi Arabia, we warned that a big disaster could be looming for the country.”

In this, the second part of our review of the leaked cables, IranWire examines Saudi Arabia’s attitudes to Iran’s role in the region, and what it plans to do about it. 

 

Bombing South Sudan

One document, classified as “Urgent, top security” discusses the possibility that Iranian fighter planes might bomb South Sudan. In the document, the Saudi foreign ministry instructs its ambassador to Sudan to conduct further investigations into the alleged presence of Iranian planes in Sudan.

 

 

According to the document, on April 1, 2012, the Saudi ambassador based in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, sent  a letter to the Saudi foreign ministry, quoting informed sources. He wrote: “Iran sent its new fighter planes to Sudan some time ago, and Iranian pilots bombed military positions in South Sudan.”

At the time, Sudan and South Sudan had clashed over the Heglig oilfield. Later that month, South Sudan forces retreated from the area.

 

Iran, Argentina and the Jewish Center Bombing

Another document concerns relations between Iran and Argentina. On July 18, 1994, a car packed with over 270 kilograms of explosives was detonated outside the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA). The building collapsed, 85 people were killed and more than 300 were injured. A number of intelligence agencies accused the Islamic Republic of Iran of being behind the attack and, as a result, relations between the two countries became strained. The Argentine judiciary accused Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah of organizing the attack.

The letter also reveals that Syrian president Bashar al-Assad was mediating between the two countries.

 

 

According to the document, Assad’s mediation led the Argentine Foreign Minister Héctor Timerman to pay a visit to Damascus, during which he came to an understanding with the Iranians.

“Iran pledged to maintain and expand its trade relations with Argentina and to purchase a big portion of Argentinian soya and other agricultural produce,” the letter says. “Last year Iran imported $1.5 billion from Argentina and this year this amount is expected to rise to $2 billion.”

The letter points out that this volume of agricultural imports was considerably higher than the Iranian domestic demand and that Iran would be forced to sell many of the products for a lower price than what it initially paid Argentina for them.

The letter explains that “recently,” and because of the nature of leftist governments in South America, Iran and its allies such as Hezbollah believe they are well placed to expand their influence there, and to use a common hostility toward the United Stated as a tool.

But the letter predicts that, considering the active presence of the Jewish community in Argentina and the influence of the United States, Iran will not be successful in improving its relations with Argentina beyond a certain level.

 

The UAE and the Three Persian Gulf Islands

Despite their small size, three islands in the eastern Persian Gulf have become some of the most strategic locations in the world. Oil tankers and other large vessels must pass between Abu Musa, Greater Tunbs and Lesser Tunbs, which are situated near the Strait of Hormuz. In 1971, immediately after British troops left the islands, the Shah’s forces occupied them. Ever since, they have been a bone of contention between Iran and the Persian Gulf Arab countries, especially the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which was established a few days after the occupation.

In 2012, UAE officials protested against then president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s visit to Abu Musa. The officials referred to the visit as a “provocation”. Iran responded that the islands were an integral part of Iran and not subject to negotiations.

On April 13, 2012, the Saudi embassy in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the UAE, wrote to the Saudi foreign ministry. It informed the ministry that the UAE prime minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, had told a cabinet meeting that the UAE wanted to maintain relations with Iran and that he had issued orders to solve the issue of the “three Iranian-occupied UAE islands” through negotiations or some other legal framework.

 

 

In another letter — Wikileaks has only published the second page of it — the Saudi embassy in UAE wrote to the foreign ministry. It said it had “received information” that showed that the UAE was in negotiations with Iran. Iran had pressured the UAE to refuse to take sides against Bashar al-Assad and to oppose a military attack against Syria. In exchange, the letter outlined that “Iran would not adopt a hardline position in regard to the three occupied islands.”

According to the letter, these negotiations explain the UAE’s “ambiguous position” toward the situation in Syria. Although the UAE had cooperated with the international community in containing Syria, it said it would oppose a military attack on the country.

 

 

The second part of the document points to the help that the UAE gave Iran to help it bypass economic sanctions. “The information we have received,” wrote the Saudi embassy, “indicate that the UAE has agreed to secretly provide Iran, through Russia, with a large portion of its $73 billion oil income that it cannot access because of the sanctions.”

Because of this decision, the letter states, the UAE “hopes that Iran would agree to negotiations over the future of the islands. The UAE is also afraid that Iran will use the port of Oman instead of UAE ports. Iran’s trade with UAE is $5.32 billion, which makes it the UAE’s fourth [largest] trading partner.”

 

Iran’s Efforts to Extend Its Influence in the Region

Several of the leaked documents reveal Saudi Arabia’s anxiety over Iran’s efforts to extend its influence in the region, from neighbors including Iraq to more distant countries such as Eritrea. The Saudi foreign ministry believes that the main thrust of these efforts is to secure those countries’ cooperation in areas such as the nuclear program.

“In mid-December 2011, a group of Iranian experts arrived in Eritrea and have been active in supervising sea and air defenses,” the Saudi embassy in Eritrea told the foreign ministry in a letter.

 

 

The letter adds that Iran had accepted close to 40 qualified Eritrean students to continue their education in Iran.

Another confidential document bearing the letterhead of the Saudi General Intelligence Directorate points out that influence of Iran in Iraq is growing. “The fact that the Iraqi Intelligence Service has downgraded its Iranian section from a division to a mere office shows Iran’s influence across the Iraqi government and indicates that Iraq no longer considers Iran dangerous to its national security,” the letter says.

 

 

It goes on: “The fact that Iraq has prepared the ground for negotiations between Iran and 5+1 countries on its soil shows that, unlike in the past, Iran no longer wants to hide its influence in Iraq and, with the acquiescence of the US, it is making its dominance public.”

A confidential letter sent by the Saudi embassy in Tehran to the foreign ministry states that Mohammad Reza Rahimi, one of President Ahmadinejad vice presidents, had requested to meet with Oman’s deputy prime minister, Fahd bin Mahmoud, on several occasions. The Omani side agreed to this meeting, which was mediated by Oman’s foreign minister.

 

 

“Rahimi has informed Oman’s deputy prime minister that Iran has agreed to export gas to Oman, but Fahd bin Mahmoud replied that Oman’s request to buy Iran’s gas is a thing of the past,” the letter states. Quoting informed sources, the Saudi embassy in Tehran writes that “it seems that Oman has completely given up on importing gas from Iran.”

 

The Change in Iran’s Nuclear Position

In a confidential document signed by the director general of the Saudi Intelligence Agency, Muqrin bin Abdulaziz, and dated April 23, 2012, Saudi officials analyzed Ayatollah Khamenei’s changing position regarding the nuclear issue.

“The Iranian leader’s acquiescence to receive help from Hashemi Rafsanjani and the Expediency Council in the nuclear case is a significant development for the case and for the relations between Iran and the West,” the confidential memo says. “Seeking help from Rafsanjani in sensitive and fateful decisions can be an indicator of the enormous political and economic pressures on Iran.”

 

 

The document also says that Khamenei’s decision to involve the Expediency Council in finding a solution for the nuclear issue shows that “the Iranian leader wants to silence the hardliner fundamentalists who oppose any concessions to the West.”

The BBC Arabic Service reports that media outlets in the  Middle East have responded to the news of the leaked Saudi differently. Syrian and Lebanese media, it says, are critical of the “Saudi dominance over Arab media,” while the media in Egypt and in the Persian Gulf Arab countries have paid more attention to the statements coming out of Riyadh, which have urged Saudi citizens to refrain from reading the documents — and threatening repercussions if citizens distribute the cables. 

 

Related articles:

The Saudi Cables and Iran: Part 1

The Saudi Cables and Iran: Part 3

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