Hardliners Furious With Nuclear Draft

As news that Iran and the P5+1 countries have finalized a draft nuclear deal for sanctions relief, hardliners have been quick to voice their anger and frustration at the state of nuclear talks.

“World powers and Iran have drawn up a draft document on the pace and timing of sanctions relief for the Islamic republic in exchange for curbs on Iran's nuclear program, advancing on one of the most contentious issues at their negotiations,” diplomats told the Associated Press on Saturday, July 4.

For many this was great news but not for Iranian hardliners, who were riled by the development.

“If there’s an “inadequate” nuclear agreement, it is the government that is “politically incompetent” and not the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, which it will try to blame,” posted hardliner member of parliament Hamid Rasaei on Google+ on July 4.   

Mr Rasaei’s post suggests that the Rouhani government should be impeached, a threat that lacks force and credibility but is demonstrative of how angry and “anxious” certain MPs are about the nuclear deal.

“We’ll break anybody’s hand” that is complicit in signing a “bad agreement,” he wrote in a note posted on the same page.

But Rasaei is not the only hardliner who shares this point of view. Hossein Shariatmadari, the managing editor at the hardliner daily Kayhan published an editorial on July 2, which said that drafting an unsigned nuclear agreement is a scheme by the United States that will do irreparable damage to Iran.

“Our nuclear team is in Vienna with every necessary power at its disposal, including the power to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’,” Shariatmadari wrote. “So if the regime’s red lines are being ignored in the suggested agreement, they are duty-bound to explicitly voice their opposition to the text and say ‘no’ in no uncertain terms. We can say without hesitation that the above-mentioned draft is a dangerous mistake for Iran and evidence that our adversary is following deceitful and dishonest rules.”

“Is our nuclear team unable to see the regime’s red lines that offer a clear explanation of what a good agreement should look like?” added Mr Shariatmadari.

 

Hardliners’ “Worst-Case” Scenario

Mehdi Mohammadi, a member of the Iranian nuclear team under former-president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, also published an article called “A bad agreement must stay in Vienna” on July 4 in the conservative newspaper Vatan-e Emrouz.

“The worst-case scenario is that the negotiating team decides to conclude negotiations and in the process brings back a vague, highly-suspect and questionable text to Tehran and places it before the authorities so that they can decide whether it’s acceptable. But if they’re courageous, honest, honorable and faithful, the negotiating team will reject a bad text right there and then in Vienna and it’ll never find its way to Tehran. The negotiating team wasn’t created to simply say yes. If Mr. Rouhani’s government wants a good agreement, then it needs to learn to be able to say no.”

However contrary to this, prior to this weekend, hardliners repeatedly demanded that the nuclear team publish details of its discussions and have parliament approve any decisions before accepting them.

On June 23, a total of 213 Iranian MPs passed a bill that requires the government to submit developments in negotiations to parliament in order to “protect Iran’s nuclear achievements” and the country’s right to nuclear proliferation. Alaeddin Boroujerdi, chairman of the parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, told Mehr News Agency that any nuclear deal involving the international community needs parliamentary approval, a demand that has been frequently reiterated by hardliners in recent months.

 

A Lack of Consistency

If parliament needs to approve or reject a nuclear deal, then why are hardliners refusing to see a draft? Shouldn’t Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif bring a draft of the nuclear deal back to Tehran so that parliament can take a look?

Perhaps hardliners are still hoping to scuttle an agreement regardless of the form it takes. Their emphasis on a “good agreement,” something that was put forward by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, is really an insistence on conditions that are impossible; terms that are incompatible with the international community.

Despite this, though, they still want Zarif or his chief negotiator Abbas Araghchi, to voice these unfeasible terms in Vienna.

Over the past two years, Ayatollah Khamenei has emphasized that the West is not trustworthy and that he does not have high hopes for negotiations but that he has given his approval because the government has insisted on it.

In reality though the Supreme Leader hopes that Iranian government officials and the negotiating team find his views to be true and that they voice them to the Iranian people. However if a draft agreement is brought to Tehran, this will be overshadowed, at least in the short term.

It is hard to predict what reactions a nuclear agreement will incite in Iran. The Supreme Leader is able to accept and defend a deal in a speech, like when Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, did when he agreed to the 1987 UN Security Council Resolution 598 that ended the Iran-Iraq war. But going on his current statements, it is difficult to foresee a time when this will happen.

Another possibility is that members of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council decide whether or not to approve the agreement, which will mean Khamenei will accept any decision they come to. This is a less risky solution for the Supreme Leader than the first option.

The Supreme Leader also has the power to oppose and reject the agreement. This is within the realms of possibility but would be unexpected given that he has had many opportunities to block negotiations in recent months and has chosen not to.

He also has the option to remain silent on nuclear developments or to say in a speech that he does not believe the agreement is practically implementable even if he supports it. This would mean that in the next couple of years when implementing it encounters difficulties, he can step in and put a stop to any further progress. Considering Ayatollah Khamenei has acted erratically in the past, this would be neither unexpected nor impossible. Lastly, he could leave the entire decision to parliament.

 

The Least Risky Option

Presently, allowing parliament to decide whether the agreement is implemented seems the least risky way out for Ayatollah Khamenei. If parliament, which is dominated by fundamentalists, approves the nuclear agreement, the Supreme Leader can escape all forms of criticism whatever the outcome. This will mean “collective wisdom” has come to the decision, without his signature, and will grant parliament a supervisory role in the process. This will also give MPs manifesto ammunition for the upcoming parliamentary elections in February 2016 by allowing them to depict themselves as people capable of negotiating and coming to compromise. Equally, if parliament rejects the deal, Khamenei will be free of responsibility.

The problem is that Khamenei is used to having the last word, which means granting parliament this authority will be a difficult choice for him to make. Giving the Supreme National Security Council this responsibility is more in-line with his political character and taste.

Every one of these options entails their own difficulties and complexities. But bringing an unsigned nuclear draft to Tehran would certainly be the most perilous one.

The signing and approval of the nuclear agreement has now become Iran’s biggest challenge for securing a deal. Up to now, the Supreme Leader and hardliners have said nothing to suggest that they think that the agreement in the works is a good one and will certainly not take responsibility for signing a bad one. This final stretch of negotiations in Vienna is paradoxically the start of Iranian hardliners’ most difficult days in Tehran.

 

Related articles:

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