A tense diplomatic fight is unfolding in the South Caucasus, where a 42-kilometer stretch of Armenian land has become the center of shifting alliances that could reshape the region.
Vahan Kostanyan’s recent trip to Jerusalem marked more than a routine diplomatic visit.
As Armenia’s deputy foreign minister, his meeting with Israeli officials showed that Yerevan is moving closer to the West and further away from its longtime ally, Iran.
A week later, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi went to Baku in what many see as Tehran’s attempt to hold on to influence in a region where it is quickly losing ground.
The Zangezur Corridor project is a fundamental realignment in a volatile region where Russia, Iran, Turkey and Western powers have competed for influence for centuries.
At its core is a transportation route through southern Armenia that would connect Azerbaijan proper with its exclave of Nakhchivan, providing a land bridge that circumvents Iranian territory.
An agreement signed in Washington on August 8 by President Donald Trump and the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan gives an American company control of the route for up to 99 years.
The deal encompasses not just railways and roads but also gas and oil pipelines and fiber optic cables, infrastructure that could reshape regional trade patterns and energy flows.
Investor interest in Armenia has significantly increased since the Washington agreement, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said recently, adding that his government is formulating the strategic framework and that work is progressing at a satisfactory pace.
For Azerbaijan, the corridor is nothing short of vital.
Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov told a meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Vienna that the 42-kilometer section through Armenia is critical for the South Caucasus’s future.
The multifaceted corridor, he said, would bring significant economic and geopolitical benefits for Armenia and the entire region while creating an unobstructed connection between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan.
But the project has placed Iran in an uncomfortable position. For years, Tehran accused Azerbaijan of enabling Israeli presence on Iran’s northern borders.
Now, with Armenia - traditionally Iran’s regional partner - courting Israel and embracing American-led infrastructure projects, the Islamic Republic faces a diplomatic dilemma.
Iranian officials have attempted to downplay concerns. After the Trump Corridor agreement, Araghchi announced that the “corridor” issue has been completely set aside and there is only talk of a transit route under Armenian sovereignty.
Government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani dismissed social media “exaggerations,” emphasizing that the Zangezur Corridor represents only a small part of Iran’s northern border.
After the 12-day war between Israel and Iran, Tehran appears to have accepted the corridor’s inevitability.
The harsh, threatening rhetoric that characterized previous Iranian statements has largely disappeared, replaced by more measured positions from officials in recent weeks.
Iranian state media’s coverage of the Armenia–Israel talks reveals Tehran’s anxiety. Tasnim News Agency cited Israeli experts saying Armenia “has little attraction for Israel” and is considered a “potential risk” as an ally of Iran and “an air base for transferring Iranian shipments that often have a military nature.”
The same outlet quoted Israeli analysts describing relations with Baku as tested through difficult trials, with the Tel Aviv–Baku line “always a priority for Israel.”
Relations with Yerevan, by contrast, were characterized as “only a third-rate route” given Israel’s “strategic partnership link with Azerbaijan as well as common geopolitical and commercial interests.”
Other Iranian outlets echoed similar themes. The Alef news website, citing Russian experts, wrote that from Israel’s perspective, Armenian representatives’ close contacts with Palestinian groups create the main obstacle.
Sahar TV, which broadcasts in Azeri, wrote that while Israeli and Armenian officials emphasized strengthening political and economic ties, “Armenia’s relations with Iran is one of the determining factors in this country’s view of Israel.”
The coverage represents what analysts describe as an effort to minimize the significance of warming Armenia–Israel relations and maintain the appearance of Iranian influence in the Caucasus, even as that influence wanes.
Azerbaijani media and experts see the situation differently. They view Armenia’s pivot as validation of Baku’s long-standing strategic alignment with Israel and the West, and as an opportunity to pressure Tehran into reconsidering its regional policies.
“Israel and Armenia have never had good relations,” wrote Yeni Musavat, a newspaper close to the Azerbaijani government. “This goes back to the support Israel provided to the Republic of Azerbaijan in the Karabakh war.
“On the other hand, the Islamic Republic has supported Armenia. Now paradigms in the South Caucasus are changing. Baku and Yerevan have reconciled and this creates the necessity of policy revision.”
The Telegraph.az website said that while Trump has provided diplomatic support for the corridor and Israel sees it as an opportunity for regional cooperation, fundamental obstacles remain.
These include the dispute over the Armenian Quarter in Jerusalem and Yerevan’s continued proximity to Tehran.
Azerbaijani political analyst Qabil Huseynli offered a blunt assessment in an interview with Musavat newspaper.
He said, “Armenia’s recent actions are completely anti-Iranian.” He cited the transfer of corridor supervision to an American company, consideration of Israeli strategic interests in the route, and the deployment of European observers at Armenia’s borders as moves that create sensitivity in Iran.
“Tehran must come to terms with it,” Huseynli said. “Because it has no ally in this matter.”
Fikrat Naserodinzadeh, a political affairs expert, framed the corridor as providing Azerbaijan a land route to Nakhchivan while giving Armenia an “economic breathing space.”
But he acknowledged that Russia and Iran are dissatisfied with the arrangement.
“Armenia must resist the pressures of these two countries with Western support,” Naserodinzadeh said.
He pressed for a fundamental shift in Iranian thinking and said, “Iran should know who is bringing the Islamic Republic’s enemy forces closer to its borders, Azerbaijan or Armenia?”
While relations have normalized during President Masoud Pezeshkian’s tenure, Naserodinzadeh argued, “there has been no change in the view of the Islamic Republic’s conservative regime.”
Not all observers see the various relationships as directly interconnected.
Rufiz Hafizoglu, speaking to Cross Media, said issues related to Armenia, Iran and Israel “do not necessarily have a direct effect on each other, but are the result of each country’s independent foreign policy.”
Still, Hafizoglu acknowledged complications. “Contrary to some claims, Armenia–Israel relations have always existed and are now being strengthened,” he said. “But Armenia’s dependence on Iran, anti-Israel domestic atmosphere and the instability of this country’s geopolitical line confront the path of these efforts with serious questions.”
The complex dynamics reflect broader regional realignments. Azerbaijan and Armenia now emphasize that peace has been established between them and there will be no more war.
Yet Russian border forces remain stationed at the Armenia–Iran border, a reminder of Moscow’s continued presence even as its regional influence faces challenges.
Iran’s footprint in the Zangezur area remains substantial, with Iranian trucks traveling the roads and Iranian workers repairing local infrastructure.
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