Negotiation or Treason? The History of Diplomacy in the Islamic Republic

The cessation of Israeli and U.S. attacks on Iran paved the way for negotiations between the American and Iranian sides in Islamabad, Pakistan. When the Iranian negotiating team, led by Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a former IRGC commander who has long since donned the suit of a politician, sat at the negotiating table, they were once again met with accusations of treason from hardliners who now dominate not only state media but also the streets and squares of Iran.

We sat down with Touraj Atabaki, a professor of social history at Leiden University in the Netherlands, to discuss the historical roots of labeling Iranian negotiators as “traitors.” We asked him about recent attempts by figures like Hesamodin Ashna, who has categorized Ghalibaf among the lineage of all Iranian diplomats from the Treaty of Turkmenchay to the present, describing his performance as being in the national interest. Atabaki analyzed the “conflict management” diplomacy of the pre-revolutionary era in contrast to the Islamic Republic’s approach of “conflict instrumentalization.”

Question: Once again, a team of Islamic Republic officials engaged in negotiations with the American side, and the hardline faction that controls official platforms and state media immediately accused them of treason. Recently, Hesamodin Ashna used his personal account on X (formerly Twitter) to classify Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the recent chief negotiator, among all Iranian diplomats of the last century, insisting that none of them had betrayed the people. What is the context that makes the label of “treason” so easily applied whenever the topic of negotiation arises?

Touraj Atabaki: Let me start by noting that for years, a faction within the Islamic Republic has tried to demonstrate a continuity between the current regime and the governance system before the 1979 Revolution. In the early years of the revolution, the official narrative was built on a complete rupture from the past, the idea that Iran was reborn with the Islamic Revolution, and that everything before it was entirely rejected and belonged to the “Taghut” (tyrant) era. However, this approach gradually changed within parts of the governing system. Today, in some institutions, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we see new narratives about the pre-1979 era.

These narratives emphasize the historical continuity of certain policies, linking the Islamic Republic to the pre-revolutionary past to construct a form of historical legitimacy. For example, regarding the nuclear program, they claim it began under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, that it was a very correct plan, and that the Islamic Republic is merely the successor and executor of that same plan. When referring to how the pre-revolutionary system handled Iran’s past challenges, they sometimes celebrate those approaches, claiming the Islamic Republic is the heir to that legacy, not only honoring its achievements but also glorifying the executors of those policies. For instance, the image of Abbas-Ali Khalatbari, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (1971–1978), who was executed by a firing squad after the revolution by order of the revolutionary court, now holds a place in the history of Islamic Republic diplomacy.

Question: By pointing to historical continuity and calling Islamic Republic representatives the “heirs” of the past, is Mr. Hesamodin Ashna claiming that the approaches of the two systems in international relations are equivalent? Does Ghalibaf’s approach in the Islamabad meeting have the same weight as Khalatbari’s approach at the 1975 Algiers meeting? Was Khalatbari, when signing the peace treaty with Iraq in 1975, worried that upon his return home, state television would issue warnings against him or that newspapers would call him a traitor? Furthermore, how can one fail to see the difference between Khalatbari’s “conflict management” and Ghalibaf’s “conflict instrumentalization”? Has Ghalibaf’s instrumentalization of conflict not caused fear among regional countries like Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar—fear of the end of this war and the role Iran might play as a result? Is this instrumentalization of conflict not a part of the Islamic Republic’s identity, even in domestic policy?

Touraj Atabaki: The Islamic Republic does not intend to manage crises or conflicts. Its entire effort is focused on disrupting the scene and pitting other players against each other, with the goal of “fishing in troubled waters” to ensure its survival. Such an approach, even if it helps the Islamic Republic in the short term, not only increases the fragility and helplessness of the system but, unfortunately, threatens Iran’s territorial survival.

Question: If we consider Mr. Ashna’s post for the sake of this discussion, he excludes Vosough od-Dowleh and lists a historical period from Turkmenchay to the present, saying that Iranian negotiators from Abbas Mirza onwards have not betrayed the people, except for Vosough od-Dowleh in the 1919 Agreement. One question is: why must so many Iranian negotiators be under suspicion of treason? And secondly, were all the negotiations we have had since Turkmenchay of the same weight and significance that such a comparison can be made?

Touraj Atabaki: It must be noted that the 1919 Agreement, unlike other events of that period, was not signed in the context of a territorial crisis. The 1919 Agreement did not put us on the brink of war. Russia had experienced a revolution and, consequently, it temporarily played no significant role in Iranian politics. Britain exploited this condition, wanting to turn Iran into one of its protectorates, and Vosough od-Dowleh was intended to be the agent of this plan. During the Qajar era, we know a significant number of politicians as puppets of foreign powers, some Russophiles, some Anglophiles, and others flying the Ottoman flag. They bestowed the title of “traitor” upon each other as easily as handing out sweets. Vosough od-Dowleh is among those notorious for being an Anglophile. Of course, it is unfair to label all Qajar-era statesmen with such traits.

Let us move past the Qajars and look at developments from 1921 (1300 SH) to the present. In this period, we encounter historical junctures where Iran was sometimes confronted by a territorial crisis, which caused the country’s diplomatic apparatus to enter negotiations. In this period, we see the record of a nascent government that had a more or less coherent approach to foreign policy, which can be cited as a behavioral model for us on the international stage.

For example, in 1946, after World War II, the Soviet Union was on the verge of imposing another war on Iran. Two years after WWII ended, when the Allies occupied Iran in September 1941, they committed to a treaty to withdraw their forces six months after the war’s end. Britain honored its commitment after the war, but the Soviet Union refused to withdraw its forces. Moreover, in 1946, the Soviets demanded Northern oil concessions and supported the Democratic Parties of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, which claimed autonomy. The Iranian government’s reading of this was that it was nothing but a step toward the partition of Iran. At this time, diplomacy was directly tied to territorial survival. Ahmad Qavam entered the scene with a combination of political wisdom and courage. He went straight to Moscow to negotiate with Stalin, and simultaneously referred the issue of the Soviet occupation of Iran to the United Nations. In the Security Council, Hossein Ala defended Iran’s rights with legal, calm, and measured language in a coherent and eloquent speech, the film of which can be found on YouTube. The result of this behavior by the Iranian government was the Soviet retreat and the withdrawal of its forces from Iranian soil. This victory for Iran was the result of the coordination of Iranian diplomacy and international policy within the government structure, relying on global support that arose from the birth of the Cold War.

It is simplistic for Mr. Hesamodin Ashna to say the performance of Islamic Republic diplomats is a continuation of that Pahlavi-era policy. The Islamic Republic and its diplomats do not possess a policy of “conflict management” on the international stage; rather, they apply a policy of “conflict instrumentalization” in international relations. During the Islamic Republic era, the instrumentalization of conflict has brought very great dangers to Iran, from war to sanctions.

Question: How would you portray the diplomatic approaches of the two eras to the audience: “Conflict Management” from 1921 to the 1979 Revolution versus the “Conflict Instrumentalization” of the Islamic Republic era?

Touraj Atabaki: Before addressing any ruptures or continuities, one must consider the difference in the global order of these two eras. The Pahlavi era was shaped in the context of a bipolar Cold War world, divided between the Soviet Union and the West. However, the Islamic Republic has mainly lived in the post-Cold War era, a period where multilateralism is more pronounced, and the game between the two superpowers no longer holds its former meaning.

If we look at Iran’s current situation, the shadow of war and ongoing negotiations through the lens of territorial survival, we must note an important reality: over the past hundred years, Iran’s survival has not been merely the product of military power; it has also depended on the timing of negotiations, the language of diplomacy, and the role of individuals at critical junctures. Figures such as Abdolhossein Teymourtash, Enayatollah Samii, Ahmad Qavam, and Abbas-Ali Khalatbari were executors of a “conflict management” policy to contain crises, a policy that defined the Iranian government’s approach to international relations.

This crisis management approach took root during the reign of Reza Shah, simultaneously with the formation of the modern state in Iran. At that time, Iran’s political borders were not yet stable or reliable. The central government tried to stabilize borders through negotiation, agreement, and sometimes strategic retreat. Mohammad Ali Foroughi was a prime example of this, a statesman with a precise understanding of the balance of power who knew Iran could not afford a confrontation with the great powers. Alongside him, figures like Ali-Akbar Davar, Hossein Ala, and Mahmoud Jam played roles in reducing tensions by utilizing legal and diplomatic language.

During Abbas-Ali Khalatbari’s tenure as Foreign Minister, Iran faced crises such as the issue of Bahrain and the islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs. Iran accepted the referendum results and the UN’s view on Bahrain, yet simultaneously succeeded in stabilizing its presence on the islands without war. The 1975 Algiers Agreement with Iraq was another example that prevented a large-scale military confrontation. These were all instances of combining diplomacy, conflict management, and the limited use of military power to preserve the country’s interests.

Question: If you were to illustrate the differences between that “preventive diplomacy” and the “instrumentalization diplomacy” of the Islamic Republic, what points would you emphasize?

Touraj Atabaki: One can compare Hossein Ala’s eloquent speech at the UN, where he sought global support for Iran’s position against the Soviet occupation, with the appearance of Mohammad-Ali Rajai, who utilized a revolutionary, moralistic language intended more to protest and challenge the global system than to negotiate. These are two completely different behaviors: one goes to manage conflict and gain support from the international legal system; the other goes to instrumentalize conflict, critiquing and negating that very system.

After the formation of the Islamic Republic, we can point to two crises: the hostage-taking of American diplomats and the eight-year war with Iraq. In neither of these did negotiation and diplomacy play a central role. In the hostage crisis, all mediation attempts hit a wall, and in the end, following the election of the U.S. Republicans and Reagan’s threats to attack Iran, the Islamic Republic hastily released all hostages in the middle of the night.

Regarding the Iraq war, after the liberation of Khorramshahr, Iran held the upper hand and could have prevented a grueling, attrition-based war with massive human casualties, but it did not. Ali Akbar Velayati was the custodian of Iran’s foreign policy at the time, and he did not leave a brilliant track record. In the nuclear case, we had the role-play of Javad Zarif, who claims to know the language of classical diplomacy and attempts to contain the nuclear crisis; however, the approach of the Islamic Republic remains subordinate to that same policy of “conflict instrumentalization.” Instrumentalization means using the friction between powers rather than managing the conflict on the global stage. Thus, whatever Zarif’s capabilities, they remain limited within the framework of this instrumentalist policy.

Therefore, when we look at the records of the Islamic Republic and the previous system, it is true that both claimed to defend territorial integrity. However, in the previous system, the effort to solve a potential crisis began before it occurred or escalated, and it was preventive. Iranian diplomats, backed by a coherent foreign policy, played a central role, and the costs were more limited. But in the Islamic Republic, the crisis first reaches a high level of tension, and only then do the regime’s agents head to the negotiating table, leading to a negotiation that, naturally, lacks coherent domestic support. Each faction inside has its own special approach, and any deviation by the agents and representatives of the Islamic Republic is deemed an act of treason against the revolution and the “ideals of the Imam.” So, before they even get home, they must shed the cloak of diplomacy and put on the revolutionary robe, lest they face the gallows.

Question: Although Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, as the chief negotiator for this round of Islamic Republic negotiations, has recently tried to present a logical narrative devoid of the hallucinations of Islamic Republic propaganda, it does not seem that a change has occurred in the outlook of Iran’s ruling elite. With this in mind, should his performance still be evaluated as what you described as “conflict instrumentalization”?

Touraj Atabaki: A foreign policy that moves based on the instrumentalization of conflict, in my judgment, leads to very bitter and even horrific results. Because in this method, the crisis is not reduced; rather, the tension coefficient rises. Territorial survival is not dependent solely on military power; sometimes escalating tension leads to collapse or the loss of parts of the territory. We must realize that diplomacy means knowing when, with what language, and with what level of authority one must enter negotiations. A look at Qajar history shows that when the Second Russo-Persian War began with cries of “Va Eslama!” (Oh Islam!) and the instigation of the clerics, the lasting result was the loss of the Erivan and Nakhchivan Khanates, whereas, regardless of why the war started, accepting an early ceasefire and peace could have prevented the increase in damages and the loss of those two territories.

In the current situation, a look at Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf’s record and the challenges before him makes us more familiar with Hesamodin Ashna’s concern regarding “the danger of Islamic Republic negotiators losing their credibility.” However, Ashna, in expressing his concern, is indifferent to or avoids addressing the history of this approach by the Islamic Republic. He does not want to accept the reality that, although Iran is at one of the most fateful junctures of its existence and requires different approaches to the challenges threatening its territorial integrity, the instrumentalization of conflict, due to the nature of the Islamic Republic’s theological-militarist system, remains the cornerstone of the regime’s foreign policy. Even though the Supreme Leader and a number of the revolution’s leaders are no longer among us, the door still turns on the old hinge, and this is nothing but an increase in the risks threatening territorial integrity, and political collapse aside.