The central core of power in Tehran, in an attempt to appease hardline opponents of negotiations, has been forced to re-emphasize the military and revolutionary records of its negotiators. The Principlist faction, particularly affiliates and members of the “Paydari Front,” remains the most vocal critic of the talks and the current negotiating team.
When U.S. President Donald Trump extended the ceasefire between Iran and the United States on April 21, he remarked, “The Iranian government is deeply divided.” At the same time, he emphasized that he would continue the ceasefire only until “its leaders and representatives can present a unified proposal.” The issue of the Iranian negotiating team’s lack of cohesion has been a subject of debate both within Iran and in foreign media for some time. However, the Iranian side claims that all forces are “unified.” On April 23, various Iranian officials coordinated a statement, writing: “We are all ‘Iranian’ and ‘revolutionary,’ and with the iron unity of the nation and the government, and in full obedience to the Supreme Leader, we will make the criminal aggressor regret their actions.”
Despite this joint statement, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi traveled to Islamabad on April 24. Meanwhile, in a Tehran television studio, Mohammad Marandi, a member of Iran’s negotiating team, stated that Araghchi would “have no negotiations with the Trump regime in Islamabad and will merely convey Iran’s considerations and views regarding the end of the war to the Pakistani side.” Conversely, the Foreign Minister himself stated that he had conveyed “Iran’s considerations for ending the war” to the U.S. via the Pakistani side, adding, “It remains to be seen whether the United States truly possesses a serious will to advance diplomacy.” The contradictory remarks by two officials of the same delegation on the same day revealed that internal divisions within the Islamic Republic are serious.
“America is Childish, but We Remained Silent.”
After Trump announced that there was division and multiplicity on the Iranian side, it sparked numerous reactions within Iran. For instance, the Tasnim news agency, in an analysis, labeled the claim of division a “fantasy and Trump’s wishful thinking” to compensate for his “strategic failure in the war.” The text argued that by lying about a “duality in the ruling system,” Trump intends to weaken the pillars of Iran’s power, namely its military capability and street-level popular support, whereas if the division were real, the U.S. would have been the victor. Tasnim does not say there is no difference of opinion within the negotiating team but rather emphasizes national unity.
The Iranian side, however, blames the U.S. First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref, a veteran of the reformist camp who has frequently defended negotiations, now characterizes American positions as “childish and volatile.” He argues that Washington officials “are desperately seeking a ceasefire and negotiations under pressure, but then adopt a stubborn approach.” He also emphasizes that everyone must defend the negotiating team.
Majlis (Parliament) member Mojtaba Yousefi claims that the current negotiations, led by Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, are a continuation of the victories achieved “in the field and on the streets” through the Leader’s foresight. He describes the team as one that “based on the demands of the people, the fighters, and the criticisms, has learned lessons from U.S. perfidy and the failure to recognize Iran’s power in past negotiations.” He asserts that the team emphasizes the integration of the “Axis of Resistance” (Hezbollah, Hashd al-Shaabi, Ansarallah, Hamas) and considers the Lebanon ceasefire their own achievement. However, he warns, “If America makes a mistake, a more crushing response will be given, focusing on the component of Hormuz.”
Support for the negotiating team is fragile; beneath the appearance of unity, many criticize the team and question its tactical acumen. Naser Imani, a political analyst close to the Principlist faction, argues that one of the weaknesses of the Iranian side following the Islamabad talks was silence. He states, “This silence makes it easier for the enemy to build a narrative, creates public pessimism and domestic radicalism, and may lead to the loss of public opinion.” He emphasizes that open criticism of the diplomatic team during wartime is “poison,” noting, “None of the three pillars, the military, the street, and diplomacy, should be weakened, as it destroys the whole.”
Opponents of the Content and Principle of Negotiations
The Principlist faction, especially the Paydari Front, is the most prominent critic. Majlis member Mohammad Rashidi, responding to a reporter’s question about the opposition of “40 representatives” to the talks, said, “Hamid Rasaei, a member of the Paydari Front, wrote a statement—though I am unaware of the number of signatures—stating that the negotiations have been fruitless and we have been attacked regardless.” He adds, “This mistrust stems from the fact that everything that has happened so far has been the perfidy of the other side. Even when they talk at the negotiating table, they renege later.” A notable point he makes, alongside his cynicism toward the U.S., is that Majlis members are essentially not informed about the negotiations and remain in their constituencies.
Regarding this statement by hardline members, Tehran representative Kamran Ghazanfari explains that the negotiating team must adhere to two principles: timely, transparent, and persuasive information, as well as adherence to Iran’s set conditions. “Continuing negotiations while one of the conditions has not been met is a mistake and unacceptable. We expect resistance to achieve the second precondition before the second round of talks begins.”
However, the most controversial remarks came from Mahmoud Nabavian, a member of the Majlis and also part of the negotiating team that went to Islamabad. He spoke of a “strategic error” in determining the agenda of the talks, arguing that the negotiations were not “desirable or acceptable” and had only made the other side bolder. Pointing to the inclusion of the nuclear issue in the agenda as a mistake, he stated, “This action gave the enemy hope and led to demands like the removal of nuclear materials from Iran or a 20-year suspension of enrichment; whereas, fundamentally, such a topic has nothing to do with America.” He emphasized, “The Islamic Republic will pursue its nuclear path based on its own needs, and this issue should never have been dragged into the negotiating arena.”
Ahmad Alamolhoda, the Friday Prayer Leader of Mashhad and a staunch anti-Western figure, stated on April 24: “No one is talking about a deal with America. Thank God, our people are standing united, and the Supreme Leader must decide at the head of the country. When negotiations with America proved useless and fruitless, our negotiating team was no longer willing to negotiate.” He continued, “Who in this country wants to reach a deal with America? Is there anyone who would say let’s give away our uranium for free, destroy our nuclear technology, and scrap our long-range missiles? God forbid, no one among our officials is saying such things.”
Some within this faction believe that negotiations with America should not happen at all. Majlis member Ali Khazarian explains, “War is inevitable, and the Islamic Republic has decided that any exchange of messages with the U.S. must stop. All types of messaging with America through social networks and journalists must be halted.” This directive has not only failed to be realized but has instead made divisions within the system more apparent.
Proponents of Negotiation and a Return to Order
A recurring pattern in Iranian politics is that those who favor negotiations often see hardliners as the main obstacle to any agreement. Abdoljavad Mousavi, a political commentator close to the reformist camp, says of the current opponents: “The negotiating team in Islamabad is bargaining over the interests of this land with the most ruthless and greedy creatures in the world.” However, he notes that the team faces three enemies: “hardliners,” “monarchists,” and “Zionists, who seek to disrupt the talks through bombing, assassination, and any crime you can imagine, and who will not rest unless there is blood, destruction, and slaughter.”
However, for this camp, the issue is not only the opposition but also the structure of the negotiations. Mohammad Mahmoudi, a media activist, believes that “the Islamabad negotiations will only succeed if everyone wants them to succeed; otherwise, if they are branded solely as the negotiation of Ghalibaf, Araghchi, or even Pezeshkian, whatever the result, it will not be sustainable.” He points to a deeper structural issue, arguing that Iran is “negotiating with one wing.” He lists three key reasons for potential failure: first, the goals Iran has set are maximalist; second, there is a “significant gap between diplomacy and the field”; and third, there is a “lack of a national consensus on ending or continuing the war.” He emphasizes that no such consensus has been formed among either the public or political leadership.
Reformists continue to defend negotiation as a principle. On April 21, the Reform Front of Iran issued a statement saying: “Diplomacy is not a secondary choice, but the highest manifestation of modern governance for resolving conflicts and a sign of intelligence in understanding global realities to return the country to strategic balance in the regional and global order.” While stressing that “trust in the negotiating team as agents of the national will is a necessary condition for advancing a sustainable agreement,” the Front argues that the government must shift its approach: “Achieving sustainable peace requires a decisive transition away from emotional, extremist, and isolationist approaches, and moving toward political realism and an order based on international rules.”
Ghalibaf: An Alliance of Diplomacy and the Field?
After Iran and the U.S. agreed to a ceasefire and negotiations began, some people on the streets - likely radical supporters of the regime - reacted by cursing Ghalibaf as the head of the delegation, shouting: “Mr. Ghalibaf, everything you have in this country is thanks to the blessing of our martyred Leader; damn you if you want to trample the blood of our Master!” Later, Jalal Rashidi Koochi criticized this behavior, saying: “Do those who curse Ghalibaf, Pezeshkian, and Araghchi on the street not know that for Israel, there is no difference between a Principlist, a ‘super-revolutionary,’ and a Reformist?” At the same time, he added: “We are pessimistic about the negotiations; naturally, you will not find any patriotic, nationalistic, and sane Iranian who is optimistic about negotiating with America today.”
However, this relatively balanced view of Ghalibaf is not widespread. Some do not consider him a representative of the regime, let alone Parliament. Morteza Mahmoudi, a Majlis member, says: “Parliament is in recess. Ghalibaf’s presence in the negotiations is not as a representative of the 285 members; his views are not those of Parliament. Representatives, like ordinary people, are unaware of the details of the negotiations. In this period, no importance is given to the status of Parliament; this is a dangerous development.”
Given these criticisms from the Paydari faction, rumors have circulated about Ghalibaf’s resignation or removal from the negotiating team. The media outlet Iran International claims: “Ghalibaf was rebuked in Tehran and forced to resign due to his attempt to include the nuclear energy issue as part of the negotiation agenda with America.” It also claims that “Saeed Jalili” will replace him.
These claims have been denied by media outlets close to the establishment. At the same time, support for Ghalibaf has grown among some figures, who present him as a strong option for leading negotiations. Ruhollah Lak Aliabadi, a Majlis member, argues that discrediting figures like Ghalibaf serves the enemy’s interests. He states: “A personality like Mr. Ghalibaf is someone it takes years to cultivate—a scientific, executive, and pious figure from a martyr’s family, and a commander who has excelled in various roles.”
The Foreign Ministry spokesperson, explaining his selection as head of the negotiating team, highlighted these credentials: “Selecting Mr. Ghalibaf as the Speaker of Parliament was a smart and worthy choice, given his combat background in the Sacred Defense [Iran-Iraq War] and his numerous successful responsibilities in various fields. As an elected representative of the people and Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, he is a symbol of religious democracy. Mr. Ghalibaf has effective communication with all branches of the ruling system and is trusted by different political factions and components of the regime. He also has a very good working relationship with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which can be effective in the country’s grand coordination. Alongside Mr. Araghchi, given the background of both in the Sacred Defense, this combination can act very effectively and successfully in the arena of diplomacy and the grand management of the country.”
This stance attempts to present an alignment between “diplomacy” and “the field.” However, in reality, these divisions show that the central core of power in Tehran, in order to appease hardline opponents of negotiations, has been forced to revisit and emphasize the military and revolutionary records of its negotiators.
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