Reformists at Revolution Rally: A Change of Tactic?

February 11^th is the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. It is usually celebrated with a big rally attended by the country’s leaders. What was unusual this year was the reformists’ call for people to attend. In previous years, reformists have characterized the rally as a show staged and organized by the government. They have labeled many who attend the rally as “paid thugs” and have used the low turnout as proof of the significant gap between the people and the governing authorities.

This year, however, the reformists had other motives. It was significant that President Rouhani encouraged all citizens to attend the rally. His general approach has been to promote moderation and national unity and, with the anniversary of the revolution, he was provided with a good opportunity to further promote this policy. For reformists, the threat of war, separationist movements and economic problems were solid enough reasons to support Rouhani. This view was embraced not only by moderate reformists, but also groups of people that the hardliners consider to be “extreme”, such as the Islamic Iran Participation Front, a party that was once led by the brother of reformist president Mohammad Khatami.

There are, however, more pressing issues. In a recent interview, the first vice-president, Eshaq Jahangiri, said that “reformists must define their relationship” with the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. Jahangiri himself met with Khamenei, together with the parliamentary vice-president, Majid Ansari, and an interior minister under Khatami, Abdolvahed Moussavi Lari, in February last year. At the time, reformists described the meeting as friendly and hopeful.

In fact, reformists’ positive attitude towards and calls for participation in the rally can be attributed more to their desire to improve their relationship with Ayatollah Khamenei than to their support for Rouhani. In the same vein, in recent speeches, Khatami has had positive things to say about Khamenei.

Not Going Away

But what actually happened at the rally on February 11? Khatami was absent, whether by choice or not. Some reformist figures, such as Hadi Khamenei, the younger brother of Ayatollah Khamenei, and Mohammad Reza Aref, first vice-president under Khatami, attended. Had Khatami been present, it could have been read as a sign that the political atmosphere was opening up. But instead, there were reports that 18 young activists have been arrested.

Some demonstrators carried placards calling for the hanging of the leaders of the “sedition”, referring to the leaders of the Green Movement and the unrest that followed the disputed elections of 2009. But is this the statement the government wants to deliver to reformists?

“The system’s strategy is based on the fact that the reformists are not going to go away,” said Jahangiri in the recent interview, referring to the approach adapted by the most influential members of Iran’s power structure. “Sometimes in a dialogue or interaction it must be accepted that a mistake has been made. Nobody has to play the mediator. The problem with the reformists is that they are trying to find a mediator.”

From a tactical point of view, this observation is important. At the moment, reformists have put all their eggs in one basket, supporting President Rouhani and hoping that he will become their mediator – whether it be by allowing reformist newspapers to reopen, removing the ban on the activities of the Islamic Iran Participation Front, freeing political prisoners, or releasing Mir Hossein Moussavi and other leaders of the Green Movement from house arrest. In themselves, these demands are not too much to ask. Rouhani won the presidential election using their social capital and must now use his own political might to address these issues.

Many reformists, however, disregard the will, inclination and ability of Rouhani to solve these problems. They deliberately ignore Jahangiri’s second point, even though it is the most important factor in the political equation: they must accept that they have made a mistake.

On February 11, Iranian media published statements from Mohseni-Ejei, the prosecutor general of Iran, who directly asked the leaders of the Green Movement to apologize and repent. According to the authorities that control the power structure in Iran, reformists do not need mediators and indirect messages are of no use; if they admit they have made a mistake, they will have taken the first significant step towards reaching an understanding with those who hold the power in Iran.

The Precedent

This is not without precedent. In the rift between Ayatollah Khomeini and Hussein-Ali Montazeri, who at one time was regarded as the Supreme Leader’s heir apparent, Montazeri was asked by some to repent. In his memoirs, Montazeri wrote about political and religious figures that tried to persuade him to write a letter of apology. One of these figures had written a long letter to Khomeini himself, which included sentences such as: “Dear leader, Today I confess that I was in a dark abyss and a hard blow has awakened me. I was in a sleep of ignorance and could not see what I should have seen. You taught me sharia, logic and philosophy, but I fell into the trap of devils and could not follow the right path.” There were others like it, Montazeri wrote. “They had good intentions,” he admitted. But he, however, did not relent, and he was stripped of much of his power.

This history is well known to both reformists and fundamentalists, and particularly to Ayatollah Khamenei, who was president at the time and kept a close watch on events.

Whether the leaders of the Green Movement would be willing to write letters of repentance or not is unclear, but keeping the historical precedence in mind is key to understanding a point made by Hessameddin Ashena, cultural advisor to Rouhani. Ashena said, “The question of house arrest has several aspects. If you solve all others, one aspect remains: the person who is under house arrest. He has to make a decision as well. If he cannot or does not make decision, then he will make it difficult for everybody.”

The matter becomes clearer when one views the February 11 rally through the lens of history. By taking part in last year’s presidential elections, reformists remained relevant. Prior to this, they had been afraid of becoming both politically and socially irrelevant. Now, for the same reason, they are trying to send positive messages to the “system”, and especially towards the Supreme Leader.

Politically, this tactic, or any other one, is not in itself wrong. Montazeri did not consent to writing a letter of repentance and Mir Hossein Moussavi has followed the same path. Reformists, however, can follow the opposite path and possibly create a new identity for themselves. They could even rename their parties, perhaps leading to the government granting them permission to operate.

The Iranian government has shown that it can be flexible. Some time ago, the Freedom Movement of Iran, a political party formed in the 1960s under the Shah, but banned in 2000 under the Islamic Republic, was given this option, albeit indirectly and in vague terms. So we cannot say that what happened in this week’s rally is necessarily a negative response to the reformists. They simply have to keep trying. If February 11 was not a success, there are other opportunities: April 1^st, marking the anniversary of the referendum that led to the monarchy being replaced with the Islamic Republic. And even if that does not work, there is December 30^th, the day of support for the Supreme Leader. Who knows? Maybe the reformists will find themselves lucky the third time around.