The Carlos Queiroz Story: From a Populist to a Gentleman

In the third part of IranWire’s series about Iran’s national football team, Payan Yunesipour looks at Carlos Queiroz’s push to get the Iranian national team to the World Cup — and the obstacles he faced. 

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Despite all the challenges, Queiroz became popular with Iranians. He had all the necessary attributes, displaying a powerful charisma while maintaining friendly relations with his players. And he kept this balance  throughout the many ups and downs he encountered. For example, prior to the World Cup, Iran lost 0-1 to Lebanon in Beirut, and hopes in Iran plunged. Then, in Tehran, he won against South Korea on October 16, 2012 with a team of 10 men. Iran won against Uzbekistan on its home turf on June 3, 2012 — yet in the return match in Tehran on November 14, it lost 0-1. Reaching the World Cup became a matter of “ifs” and “buts.”

But Queiroz did not allow himself to get distracted. He continued tending to his players, guiding them in a detailed manner. On October 16, 2012, the day before playing against South Korea in Tehran, he told each of his players what to do in every possible situation that might arise during the game. He even advised Ali Karimi, who was supposed to sit on the bench in that game. He also told them how to excite their fans. He told them where to play on the field if they were ahead and at what point and in which position they should play if their team fell behind. He told Jalal Hosseini that when the 197-centimeter tall South Korean striker Kim Shin-Wook took position for a stationary kick, he should stand in front of him; Andranik Teymourian, he said, should stand behind Shin-Wook. He had prepared a moment-by-moment playbook for each player.

The only player Queiroz saw no need to instruct was the goalkeeper. “When we have Mehdi (Rahmati), I see no need to worry about my team’s goal.” But, when rumors emerged that Queiroz was about to invite the German-Iranian goalkeeper Daniel Davari to join the team, Mehdi Rahmati quit. Rahmati later apologized — twice — for his impulsiveness, but that was it: the doors of the national team remained closed to him. Queiroz sent him a message: “If somebody is gone, then he is gone,” it said. He later sent the same message to the midfielder Mojtaba Jabbari and the defender Hadi Aghili after they resigned from the team. 

Despite Queiroz’s ability to be both harsh and friendly — or perhaps because of it — he remained popular with the Iranian public. “I prefer to spend my time with my team rather than listening to you,” he told then president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s Sports Minister Mohammad Abbasi during a meeting before the return match between Iran and Qatar in Doha on June 4, 2013. The rebuke was a response to Abbasi’s demand that if Iran did not beat Qatar, then the whole technical staff and management of the Iranian Football Federation would be forced to resign. During the last 15 minutes of the game with Qatar, the head of the federation, Ali Kafashian, watched the game nervously, standing up for the entire match. But when it was over and Iran was victorious over Qatar, he went straight back to his hotel, and did not even stop to visit the locker room to congratulate the team.

When Choi Kang-Hee, the head coach of South Korean team, stated that  he wanted Uzbekistan to reach the World Cup instead of Iran, Queiroz pinned a picture of hm on his T-shirt, drew a read line over it and told his players: “Take revenge against this lunatic.”

Queiroz continued his verbal offensive at a press conference held before the return match against South Korea in Seoul on June 18, 2013 — a match Iran had to win to reach the World Cup. “I am the world’s top coach,” he said. “I believe that South Korea’s coach is a stain on world football.” A photograph of him showing his fist to the South Korean coach at the end of the game will be not soon be forgotten in Iran, and in international football.

Adding to the drama was the fact that qualifications for the World Cup always coincide with Iran’s presidential elections. The Iranian national team qualified on June 18, 2013 — just four days after the presidential election. In such an atmosphere, all candidates and senior politicians rushed to make statements. Outgoing president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called it a second “epic achievement” following the election, and reformist candidate Mohammad Reza Aref agreed with him.

Mohsen Rezaee, another candidate and the former Revolutionary Guards commander, referred to the Iranian footballers as “heroes” whose “saga” had made all the lovers of the regime happy. And last but not least,  President-Elect Hassan Rouhani expressed confidence that their success was a prelude to a bigger and more powerful presence of “Islamic Iran” in all fields.

But at that moment, nobody imagined that Rouhani’s government would be forced to appoint a sports minister who would become the main obstacle blocking the advance of Iran’s National Football Team.

Coming soon: part four

Read part one: Sports, Politics and the International Stage

Read part two: From Generational Change to Change in Management